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ABSTRACT

Viscerally divisive sociopolitical issues with clear boundaries often raise
questions of constitutional legality. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not offer
guidance on a preferred method of interpretation, and so legal scholars and Supreme
Court justices alike have yet to reach a consensus. Consequently, there is still debate over
how a principled case can be made for the constitutional protection of rights not
originally covered by constitutional amendments; the legal debate over same-sex
marriage reflects this dilemma.
For same-sex marriage the question of interpretation is particularly concerned
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by extension the
rational-basis test. This test asks whether a statute that classifies people is rationally
related to a government interest. When lower courts have found a rational basis for laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage it has historically been on moral or traditional grounds.
Recently there have been several court cases that applied the Fourteenth Amendment and
did not find a rational basis for the prohibition of same-sex marriage.
This paper analyzes current methods of constitutional exegesis from a practicable
and historical perspective. It demonstrates how a right can shift under the Constitution
from unprotected to protected without requiring a paradigmatic shift in the way the
Constitution is read. It argues that, similar to previous civil-rights cases, same-sex
marriage is now protected by the Constitution, and those courts that found no rational
basis for its proscription got it right.
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PART ONE
Introduction
Folk Devils and Moral History
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right thinking people…
- Stanley Cohen1
Few subjects have caused an uproar or caught the imagination of moral majorities
more than sex. From St. Augustine of Hippo who came to see lust as “the most dangerous
of all human drives,”2 to the U.S. government’s “purge of the perverts” in the 1950s,
which commenced with Deputy Undersecretary John Peurifoy “reveal[ing] that a number
of persons considered to be security risks had been forced out [of government positions],
and that among these were ninety-one homosexuals,” 3 the fear of sexual deviance has
been a motivating force through much of history.
The most vociferous moral advocates over the last sixty years have often been
concerned with the “homosexual agenda.”4 Slowly, the LGBT community has been able

1

Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1. Stanley Cohen’s
research into moral panics was concerned more with the impact of media-created moral panics in regards to
“rebellious youth,” but his work has salience here, especially as it relates to the “moral barricades.”
2
Faramerz Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 8.
3
David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal
Government, (The University of Chicago Press, 2004), introduction, para. 3, kindle edition.
4
See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, dissenting.) (“Today’s opinion is the
product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the socalled homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”)
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to pry civil liberties from the clenched fist of society, and most recently progress has been
in the area of same-sex marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage deliver ominous
warnings of tragedies – a “parade of horribles”5 – that may befall society if same-sex
marriage is permitted, or in some cases permitted to continue.
Historically civil rights have not been granted easily, and this can often be
attributed to this paper’s namesake. “Passions and prejudices,”6 will often inform the
obstinate will of majorities in place of reason, to the detriment of equality. To be sure,
passions and prejudices were constantly referenced throughout founding era documents,
including many of The Federalist Papers. It was a fear that where reason was absent,
government would be guided by more emotive impulses.
Debate over the right for women to vote brought threats that it would lead to
higher crime and higher rates of divorce;7 debate over desegregation brought threats that
“irreparable harm will be inflicted upon the students of both the Negro and white race;”8
in the debates over interracial marriage the state argued that the very institution of
marriage was at stake, and because the family is the building block of civilization it could
lead to the disintegration of society;9 debates over gay rights have brought similar fears
despite evidence to the contrary.
This paper addresses the Constitution’s role in civil-rights cases, and in particular,
why its Fourteenth Amendment now defends same-sex marriage, even if this has yet to
5

Brief for Appellees at 92, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16751, October 18, 2010.
Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Papers: No. 1,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and
Diplomacy, last modified 2008, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed01.asp
7
J.B. Sanford, “Reasons Why Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 8 Should Not be Adopted,” vol. 11 of
The California Outlook: A Progressive Weekly,” (September 16, 1911), www.books.google.com.
8
“COOPER v. AARON,” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed November 21,
2012, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_1.
9
“LOVING v. VIRGINIA,” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed October 5,
2012, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395.
6
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be recognized in all fifty states or the Supreme Court. This paper aims to show that while
in some cases there may be legitimate criticism about the Supreme Court’s fidelity to the
Constitution, civil rights cases like Brown v. Board of Education, which desegregated
schools; Loving v. Virginia, which struck down anti-miscegenation laws; Reed v. Reed,
which said women are constitutionally equal to men; and now the case of same-sex
marriage, do not violate the Constitution but rather are inevitable consequences of a static
document being applied to a polity over a long period of time.
Segregation was permitted until 1954 when the Supreme Court ruled that it had
become unconstitutional. States were permitted to prohibit interracial marriage until
1967, when it suddenly became unconstitutional. Until 1971 gender was not covered by
the Equal Protection Clause – discriminating against women in state laws was
constitutionally permissible. Then in Reed v. Reed, a state law that “provide[d] []
different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex” was struck
down as the “very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 More recently, laws that discriminate against
homosexuals have been struck down in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.
Strong disagreement pervades the literature regarding the proper role of the
judiciary. Much of it is spent analyzing whether or not civil-rights decisions, like Brown
v. Board of Education, were correctly adjudicated. Regardless of whether a scholar
agrees with the conclusion, some argue that it was inappropriate for the judiciary to step

10

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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in, and by doing so they usurped the power of the legislatures, i.e. the people. Some who
take this view argue that a legitimate case can be made for Brown, but it just wasn’t.11
This paper serves two purposes. It answers how something like segregation can
go from being permitted to being prohibited when the same text is applied to the same
situation, and further that like segregation, interracial marriage, and the equal treatment
of women, same-sex marriage is a question of equal protection and is indeed covered by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
As one of the more recent victims of being labeled deviant by a moral majority,
the gay community has come under fire in a way that demonstrates the salience of
sociologist Stanley Cohen’s work. According to Cohen, those engaged in a moral panic
will identify a group, called folk devils, as deviant:
The deviant is assigned to a role or social type, shared perspectives develop
through which he and his behaviour are visualized and explained, motives are
imputed, causal patterns are searched for and the behavior is grouped with other
behaviour thought to be of the same order.12

Of the same order is dangerous territory. When panic ensues that order is often
exaggerated or even utterly unrelated. In 1950, during the Red Scare, “three of President
Harry Truman’s top advisors wrote him a joint memorandum warning that ‘the country is
more concerned about the charges of homosexuals in Government than about
Communists.’”13 Civil-rights struggles are often difficult because they become politicized
and politicians create a vicious cycle. Irrational fears are exacerbated by political rhetoric,

11

See McConnell, “Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,” (1995); see also Burt, “What Was
Wrong with Dred Scott, What’s Right about Brown,” (1985).
12
Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 57.
13
Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 2.
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and political rhetoric is fueled by a desire to impress constituents about how tough they
are on society’s irrational fears.
Indeed, the gay community has had to deal with accusations of being deviant and
therefore likely to commit a cadre of actions associated with deviance. Unlike skin color
or gender, homosexuality has had the unique fight of whether it is a choice or not, and
this has stifled its struggle for civil rights. Homosexuals have had to deal with their own
identity in a civilization that stigmatizes and marginalizes them, while society’s recent
treatment has often ranged from abuse to perplexity. The discreet nature of
homosexuality leads to the kind of misunderstanding that led columnist Robert C. Ruark
to suggest, “it is possible to face the problem of homosexuality and perversion with the
same honesty it took us so long to win the case of venereal disease.”14 Of course, unlike
VD, homosexuality cannot be “cured,” and certainly not with antibiotics.
Same-sex marriage has been deemed the “last civil rights battle,” and while equal
protection appears prima facie to treat same-sex couples in an equal manner to differentsex couples, this is not currently the case. Broadly speaking, the issue of same-sex
marriage must contend with two arguments in the U.S. legal system: (1) it is not a
constitutional matter and therefore should be left to the state legislatures to decide, and
(2) it poses some threat to society. The first argument is contingent on how the
Constitution is interpreted, whereas the second argument is contingent on the ability of
opponents to articulate a hypothetical harm caused by the marriage of same-sex couples.
The larger portion of this paper focuses little on the specific issue of same-sex
marriage, and more on the question of how something becomes constitutionally

14

Ibid., 6.
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protected. The first argument concerns the theory behind constitutional law and
interpretation and is inherently a more complex subject than defining harm. The second
argument and same-sex marriage are therefore not specifically addressed until the last
two chapters.
Importantly, this paper’s approach is a minimal one. There are countless
arguments, political, legal, and of course philosophical in regards to same-sex marriage
and separately the Constitution. There are some salient points to be made in regards to
constitutional interpretation, the justification for state coercion, and morality that this
paper does not cover. Its thesis is one that does not need to go beyond a minimal level of
analysis. That is, this paper concedes a great deal more than might be necessary to make
the same point. It does so chiefly to maintain boundaries, but secondly because it can; as
this paper intends to demonstrate, for the most conservative and restrained scholar of
constitutional law to invoke a method of exegesis consistently would require the
inclusion of sexual orientation and subsequently same-sex marriage under the Equal
Protection Clause.
As with most civil-rights cases, hidebound majorities will often grasp at straws
leaving defenders of civil rights debating what would otherwise be considered inane or
irrelevant arguments. Because this paper addresses same-sex marriage, it is important to
establish some facts about homosexuality and marriage lest a reader enter this discussion
with less than accurate information.

9

I. Choice

Some proponents of same-sex marriage will argue that whether sexual orientation
is or is not a choice shouldn’t have bearing on the issue, as people should be able to live
their lives as they please. There are some very cogent arguments to this point, however, it
ignores the reality of both the political implications and the rights being proscribed. The
difference between acts and orientation is the difference between a behavior and an
immutable characteristic completely inseparable from the individual. This will be
addressed more specifically later, but for now consider this: the Equal Protection Clause
– which is what this paper’s argument turns on – forbids a state from denying equal
protection to “person[s].” Any choice is not inextricably part and parcel of that person;
orientation is a defining characteristic of a person. The question it seems is whether that
trait exposes society to harm.
It is true that any person can engage in homosexual activity, but the activity does
not imply orientation. In regards to sexual orientation, (i.e. erotic attractions and sexual
arousal oriented to one sex or the other, or both),15 this paper will strictly adhere to what
the evidence shows: that it is in fact an immutable characteristic inseparable from the
person. Whatever a person’s orientation might be, and it does not always come in
absolutes, it is defining and without the possibility of change. Attempts at change are
continually denounced as harmful and the claims of supposed reparative therapies have
been said to “mischaracterize homosexuality and promote the notion that sexual

15

B.S. Anton, “Proceedings of the American Psychological Association for the legislative year 2009:
Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives and minutes of the meetings of the Board
of Directors,” American Psychologist, 65, 385–475, (2010) doi:10.1037/a0019553
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orientation can be changed.”16 The American Psychological Association observed some
unfortunate effects of attempting to change orientation:
Distress and depression were exacerbated. Belief in the hope of sexual
orientation change followed by the failure of the treatment was identiﬁed as a
signiﬁcant cause of distress and negative self-image.17

Although it is not the place of this paper to get involved in the essentialist versus social
constructionist debate,18 current research seems to favor the essentialist school of
thought. A 2010 paper in Pediatric Neuroendocrinology stated:
The fetal brain develops during the intrauterine period in the male direction
through a direct action of testosterone on the developing nerve cells, or in the
female direction through the absence of this hormone surge. In this way, our
gender identity (the conviction of belonging to the male or female gender) and
sexual orientation are programmed or organized into our brain structures when
we are still in the womb. However, since sexual differentiation of the genitals
takes place in the first two months of pregnancy and sexual differentiation of the
brain starts in the second half of pregnancy, these two processes can be
influenced independently, which may result in extreme cases in transsexuality.
This also means that in the event of ambiguous sex at birth, the degree of
masculinization of the genitals may not reflect the degree of masculinization of
the brain. There is no indication that social environment after birth has an effect
on gender identity or sexual orientation.19

While this paper favors the essentialist view, it does not dismiss the importance of social
construction. Indeed, it has been established that the delineation between heterosexual
and homosexual was drawn around the early eighteenth century, when the heterosexual

16

Ibid., at 29.
Ibid., at 30.
18
The essentialist school of thought posits that sexual orientation is inborn, while the social constructionist
school of thought posits that orientation is a construct of society and culture. For a more thorough
discussion see Phillips, “Constructing Definitions of Sexual Orientation in Research Theory,” (2007).
19
Alicia Garcia-Falgueras and Dick F. Swaab, “Sexual Hormones and the Brain: An Essential Alliance for
Sexual Identity and Sexual Orientation,” ed. P.-E. Mullis, Pediatric Neuroendocrinology 17 (2010): 22-35.
17
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and the homosexual emerged because of changing social constructs.20 As philosopher and
social constructionist Michael Focault noted, “[t]he sodomite had been a temporary
aberration; the homosexual was now a species.”21 “The more clearly the line was drawn,
[between acceptable and deviant behavior,] the more emphatically the homosexual or any
other subculture [that] was labeled different and distinct, the more likely it was that such
a subculture would develop a group consciousness, a sense of its own separateness and
identity.”22 Regardless of the school of thought to which a person subscribes, it should be
noted that both acknowledge the immutable aspect of sexual orientation.23
If sexual orientation is indeed beyond modification, this would logically coalesce
with a 1996 University of Georgia study that found “[h]omophobia is apparently
associated with homosexual arousal that the homophobic individual is either unaware of
or denies.”24 It would seem that if orientation is beyond conscious control, that a person
who strongly believes that their own orientation has been a choice might in fact be
choosing heterosexual behavior in spite of a more homosexually inclined orientation.
Again, this does not mean there are only absolutes in regards to sexual orientation, but
that whatever an individual’s orientation is, it is immutable. This is the position from
which this paper will work.

20

Randolph Trumbach, Sex and the Gender Revolution Vol. 1: Heterosexuality and the Third Gender in
Enlightenment London, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 4.
21
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: An Introduction, tr. Robert Hurley (New York:
Vintage Books, 1980), 43.
22
Nicholas C. Edsall, Toward Stonewall: Homosexuality and Society in the Modern Western World,
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 69.
23
JW Smitt, “Homosexuality in a new light,” International Journal of Sexology 6 (1952): 36–39.
24
Henry E. Adams, Lester W. Wright, Jr., and Bethany A. Lohr, “Is Homophobia Associated With
Homosexual Arousal?” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 105 (1996): 440.
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II. History

Throughout human history, from the most primitive humanoid societies to present
day, homosexuality has been part of human existence.25 Various cultures have
historically treated it differently. Stories from the Zhou dynasty and Ming dynasty
include many same-sex marriages and relationships.26 The ancient Egyptians used to
practice same-sex marriage,27 and from the Babylonians28 to the Greco-Roman era,29
same-sex relationships flourished.
Marriage as an institution has undergone significant changes; it has not always
concerned itself with the church or the state. Indeed, “[i]n considering whether marriage
has a fixed essence or definition, the historical and cross-cultural diversity of marital
practices cannot be overstated.”30 For the Greek philosophers marriage was “a political
and economic unit,”31 and it was the Christian philosophers who introduced a “stern
sexual morality,”32 which stressed an “ascetic ideal of abstinence.”33

25

See Ryan and Jethá, Sex at Dawn (2010). See also Niell, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in
Human Societies (2009). See also Boswell, Christianity, Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1981). See also
Eskridge, Jr., “A History of Same-Sex Marriage” in Vir. L. Rev. (1993).
26
James Neill, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in Human Societies, (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009), chapter 10, Kindle edition.
27
William N. Eskridge, Jr., “A History of Same-Sex Marriage,” Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1419.
(“The implication that same-sex intimacy was common in Egypt (and Canaan) is confirmed by the Sifra, an
exegetic midrash interpreting the book of Leviticus.” The Sifra explains that one reason the Israelites were
prohibited from acting as they do in Egypt is “A man would marry a man, and a woman would marry a
woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter, a woman would be married to two men.”)
28
Neill, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in Human Societies., chapter 4, Kindle edition.
29
Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction.
30
Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012), introduction, Kindle edition.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex, 7.
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The Christian tradition altered the view of sex, which had been more liberal under
previous Jewish law,34 into something corrupting as it “seduced one’s mind and body
away from its highest purpose of communing with God.”35 Sex became something that
was to be avoided, but “if [people] cannot contain [their lusts], let them marry: for it is
better to marry than to burn.’”36 One of the most influential philosophers on Christian
ideals of sex was St. Augustine (354 - 430 AD) who propounded this ideal of chastity and
“condemn[ed] [] sex outside of marriage and lust within it.”37
After Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire, under
emperor Theodosius, church officials became more intertwined with the state, taking on
“more quasi-governmental functions.”38 When Rome collapsed “the pope headed one of
the few institutions able to raise money, administer law, preserve records,”39 and so on.
Eventually, “the church’s evolving political role and economic power were to embroil it
deeply in the politics of marriage, divorce, and family life in the new kingdoms of
Western Europe.”40
Until the twelfth century the church required sexual intercourse to seal a marriage.
Then bishop Peter Lombard of Paris pointed out that if this were the case, “Mary and
Joseph could not have been legally married.” The validity of marriage no longer required
sex.41 As the church’s influence spread, it was gathering a greater diversity of adherents,
many of whom had entered into marriages informally. Initially the church recognized
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Ibid., 6.
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., (quoting Paul the Apostle).
Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction.
Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005), chapter 5, iBook edition.
Ibid., chapter 5.
Ibid., chapter 5.
Ibid., chapter 7.
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these informal marriages and required no more than “mutual intent or the blessing of a
parent…to solemnize a marriage.”42 Christianity did not require an official of the church
to preside over marriage until 1215, when the church decided that it “did not like being
put in the awkward position of defending young couples who, by privately exchanging
their vows, married in defiance of their parents’ wishes.”43 In response to this problem,
[T]he Fourth Lateran Council declared in 1215 that “we absolutely prohibit
clandestine marriages.” For a marriage to be valid, the council stated, three things
were necessary: The bride had to have a dowry, which effectively undercut the
independence of a young woman from her parents; banns had to be published
beforehand; and the wedding had to take place in a church.44

Clandestine marriages slowed but never ceased entirely and to further combat
this, England passed the Marriage Act of 1753.45 On the shores of the United States, the
colonies did not always have the resources to deal with the idea of civil marriage, and so
“although laws concerning marriage existed, informal or ‘self-marriage’ and self-divorce
(without official authorization), sometimes followed by remarriage, were widespread.”46
What “traditionalists”47 call marriage, and what they try to protect, is a relatively
new institution. The more specific the description gets – e.g. with love, not for property,
monogamous, consensual, and so on – the newer and more innovative the definition
becomes. There were certainly exceptions, including those who fell in love, but regarding
normative standards, the contemporary traditionalist’s conception is novel. Even in
regards to monogamy the long-arc of history shows that “polygyny, not monogamy, has
42

Ibid., chapter 7.
Ibid., chapter 7.
44
Ibid., chapter 6.
45
Ibid., chapter 7.
46
Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction.
47
See generally Wax, “Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage,” (2007); See also Wax, “The
Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage,” (2005).
43
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been dominant—and has existed within the Judeo-Christian tradition, a fact for which
both Augustine and Aquinas apologize.”48
Indeed, what many consider defining aspects of marriage are contingent on time
and place. There are many examples of societies that flourished without heteronormative
exclusivity in marriage, but the newness to culture in the United States produces
something akin to moral panics. Considering marriage in the United States, it seems the
conditions relevant to the state that must be satisfied to merit a legal recognition of
marriage are minimal.
This work is divided into two parts. Part I consists of Chapters One – Three,
which address constitutional theory. Part II consists of chapters Four – Six, which
addresses the history and application of the provisions relevant to this matter. In
addressing the exegetic process, Part I is imperative to understanding Part II, because it
illuminates why changes in knowledge produce inevitable changes within the
Constitution. This is not a matter of simply moral changes or changes in opinion, but
rather how changes in knowledge produce changes in fact.
Chapter One answers the question of why in a democracy people would vest in
“electorally unaccountable justices”49 the power to overturn democratically adopted
legislation. This chapter establishes a point that will be revisited throughout the paper:
while our government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, the reason it
is not a direct democracy is because of the fear that an irrational majority may tyrannize a

48
49

Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction.
See infra note 86.
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minority. It addresses what Alexander Bickel termed the counter-majoritarian
difficulty,50 which was not foreign to those who ratified the Constitution.
Chapter Two will address constitutional exegesis – both methods and problems
inherent with those methods. Same-sex marriage must contend with methods lauded by
more conservative justices and constitutional law scholars. These methods claim it never
was covered by the Constitution and therefore it cannot legitimately be covered without
the people’s consent on the specific issue. These methods contend that to do otherwise is
to usurp the power of the people, placing it into the unaccountable hands of the judiciary.
Because justices tend to use an amalgam of the methods discussed, the chapter will
principally focus on the problem of reading the Constitution with a eighteenth or
nineteenth century mindset.
Chapter Three will discuss why the provisions of any written document that is
designed to remain relevant over a long period of time will necessarily incur change. It
will consider how the provisions within a text can maintain fixed meanings while the
objects they refer to change.
Chapter Four begins Part II, which looks at the construction and history of the
Equal Protection Clause. This section is of particular importance because it also
demonstrates the lack of rationale with which passionate majorities inimical to the rights
of minorities will pursue their ends. When reason succumbs to passion and prejudice,
opponents of civil rights will look for every loophole, make every claim that they can
find, and even when faced with the most explicit pronouncements against their wishes,
admittedly defy the Constitution, and compel the Supreme Court to act.
50

Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).
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Chapter Five sets the stage for the arguments explored in Chapter Six. The
question of what conditions an argument must satisfy to warrant a rational basis for the
unequal treatment of persons is answered here. Civil-rights cases are often subjected to a
wide range of arguments, some of which have no conceivable footing in reality.
Consequently, this chapter starts by establishing that, as a product of the Enlightenment,
the United States was founded on the emphatic employment of reason in lieu of more
impassioned impulses.
Chapter Six engages those arguments which opponents to same-sex marriage
invoke. With a full understanding of the Equal Protection Clause and the rational-basis
test, it should become clear that the arguments leveled at same-sex marriage do not create
a rational basis rooted in either logic or history. This chapter uses the Proposition 8 samesex marriage case from California, to build a framework of arguments and fleshes them
out with those posited by Professor Amy Wax, the Robert Mundheim Professor of Law at
University of Pennsylvania Law School. This work then concludes by combining all
points hitherto discussed and considering the reality of civil rights in American
jurisprudence.
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Chapter One
The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
It may sound oddly to say that the majority is a faction; but it is,
nevertheless, literally just. If the majority is partial in their own favor, if
they refuse or deny a perfect equality to every member of the minority,
they are a faction; and as a popular assembly, collective or
representative, cannot act, or will, but by a vote, the first step they take, if
they are not unanimous, occasions a division into majority and minority,
that is, into two parties, and the moment the former is unjust it is a faction.
-John Adams
March 22, 177851
Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for dinner.
- Unknown52
“This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored
by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing
that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil. I vigorously dissent.”53 Justice Antonin
Scalia was once again castigating his fellow justices for purportedly usurping the power
of the people to the detriment of the Constitution. In Colorado a statewide referendum
had passed which “preclude[d] all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of
state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their
‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’”54 It
was a unique law in that its purpose was to prevent other laws that might be passed to

51

John Adams and Charles Francis Adams, The works of John Adams, Second President of the United
States: with a life of the author, notes and illustrations, Vol. VI. (Boston: Charles C. Little And James
Brown, 1851), 60.
52
Frequently misattributed to Benjamin Franklin. Also attributed to James Bovard of the Sacramento Bee.
53
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). (Scalia, dissenting.)
54
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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protect the gay community. The Supreme Court found that such a law was remarkably at
odds with the Constitution and struck it down. Scalia believed otherwise.
This interplay between the will of democratic majorities and the court’s
obligation, to uphold constitutionally protected individual rights, is emblematic of what
Alexander Bickel termed the counter-majoritarian difficulty. It has become acutely part
of our constitutional government. In western liberal democracies, what is considered
legitimate power is derived from the consent of the governed; on the other hand, tyranny
of the majority is a real problem of which the framers of the Constitution were well
aware. It is a problem that has beleaguered our constitutional democracy since its
inception and there is still an impassioned debate as to the best way to answer it.
Constitutional scholars who give the most deference to authority and individual
states, will perceive the court’s role as minimal and to some extent indifferent to
individual rights. Some have argued that because the framers included “those rights a
tyrannical government had traditionally moved against,” and left out other rights, that
“they don’t care” about personal rights.55 This view will often manifest itself in states’rights arguments: if a majority within a state adopts legislation, it is up to that state to
repeal it, and not the business of the federal judiciary to step in. This is the base-level
argument that allows a person to believe that states infringing on personal rights do not
raise constitutional questions.
Contrary to this are the scholars who give deference to the individual over
government. They will point out that while states’-rights are important, to defer to the
states at the expense of the individual, is to miss the reason that there was a debate over
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the relationship of the state and federal government in the first place; indeed, the AntiFederalists argued that local, state control was a better guard of individual rights. The
Federalists disagreed, and it was the Federalists’ constitution that was adopted. One tool
established to ensure those rights in the Constitution are protected from majorities acting
through government was judicial review.
The act of judicial review is the “proper and peculiar province of the courts,”56
but its nature has long been a cause of trepidation. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison expressed his misgivings about “the Judiciary [being] paramount... to the
Legislature.”57 He stated that this was never meant to be and “can never be proper.”58 It is
a precarious device, because at once it theoretically allows protection of minority groups
from the “tyranny of the legislatures,”59 while at the same time giving the only unelected
branch of government a power that is supposed to be retained by the people.
While Madison wrestled with the idea himself, he seemed to reconcile the issue
just enough to publicly support it – at least around the time of ratification. He declared
that the Constitution as fundamental law was antecedent to all other laws: “A law
violating a constitution established by the people...would be considered by the Judges
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null & void.”60 On June 8, 1789 while arguing for a Bill of Rights, he referred to the
courts as “independent tribunals of justice” and justices as the “guardians of…rights.”61
Any extant reservations gave way to practical necessity and congress passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly demarcated the judicial supremacy of the
Supreme Court. Hamilton seemed less conflicted as he had argued for its purpose in
Federalist Paper, No. 78. “It is urged” he said, “that the authority which can declare the
acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared
void.”62 It cannot be a “natural presumption” that the legislature is to police itself. “It is
far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority.”63 He continued, casting aside any doubt as
to who should determine the meaning of provisions in question, “…A constitution is, in
fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding
from the legislative body.”64 Hamilton argued that of the three branches of government,
the judiciary was the “least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.”65
Finally, it was codified within the American legal system in Marbury v. Madison, when
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “…It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”66
Judicial review necessarily changes the relationship between the courts and the
legislatures. In regards to where the line in the sand must be drawn between majority rule
and individual rights, Alexander Bickel asked,
Which values…qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or whathaveyou
to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by legislative acts?
And how is the Court to evolve and apply them?67

Whatever values may or may not warrant court intervention, the bottom line is
that “From the beginning…the language of America has been the language of rights.”68
To what degree may be up for debate, but in recent decades something of a cynical
backlash has emerged because of this almost uniquely American emphasis on rights.
Indeed, “…So great has the preoccupation with rights become that it has given rise to a
phenomenon that has itself become a topic of interest, rights talk.”69 Talk of rights has
become a subject of reproach, prompting one critic to refer to it as “shrill, anti-social,
irresponsible, and reductionist;”70 subsequently, a plea for rights is often dismissed.
Irrespective of any cynicism, the significance that the original ratifiers placed on
individual rights led to an emphasis on protection from majority factions within states.71
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This context directly affected the debates over ratification and the manner in which the
Constitution was organized and realized. The implications were material and permanent.
This emphasis on personal rights came about in part due to a concern over
property rights, and ironically in part as a reaction to the threat religion posed on
individual rights.72 If religion was able to touch any part of legislative acts, they knew
from experience that oppression would soon follow. It was a fight over a religious
assessment bill in Virginia that gave Madison and Jefferson a concerning insight into the
greater threat of a republican government – the state legislatures. They knew the danger
that religious passion could impose on private rights so that,
In the realm of religion…what Madison and Jefferson contested was the capacity
of the state to act at all. And they did so not on behalf of the collective right of a
people to be free from arbitrary rule, but rather to protect autonomous individuals
as the bearer of rights.73

The threat of factions became a major focus. The experience Madison earned
caused him to ponder “why, in a republic” a legislature might wield power arbitrarily and
become more dangerous to personal rights than an executive.74 He came to the conclusion
that because legislators kowtow “to the passions and interest of their constituents” the
biggest challenge would not be to protect individuals “from government,” but rather “to
defend minorities and individuals against popular majorities acting through
government.”75
Further, Madison realized that it was less likely (although not impossible) that
these kinds of factions would hinder rights at the federal level. Instead, “the true problem
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of protecting rights was to curb injustice within the individual states, where most laws
affecting property and religion (and all other ordinary activities) would still originate.”76
In his pre-convention memorandum, he considers the problem of democratic majority
rule:
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove want of wisdom, their injustice
betrays a defect still more alarming: more alarming not merely because it is a
greater evil in itself, but because it brings more into question the fundamental
principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such
governments are the safest Guardians both of public good and of private rights.77

That is, he sees it as a defect of republican government that majority rule should be
considered the “safest guardian” of private rights.
It should be noted that while Madison was the architect of the Constitution, it was
ultimately ratified by the states, some of whose signatures were contingent on the
inclusion of a Bill of Rights. There were indeed Anti-Federalists who were wary of
strong national control. This argument however, if followed to its conclusion, only serves
to bolster the individual-rights point. The Anti-Federalists were largely concerned with
the national government violating “personal rights.”78
Even the future disagreements that Jefferson and Madison came to have over the
power of the judiciary were due to the encroachment on individual rights. As Charles
Black writes,
It is true that Madison, with Jefferson, came to have deep disagreements with
some actions of the federal judiciary, particularly in the case of the Circuit Judges
who upheld the Alien and Sedition Acts but that disagreement was based on
76
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those judges’ not being vigorous enough in protecting human rights by the
judicial power. Jefferson was dissatisfied, in that controversy, with the federal
judges’ not having been sufficiently “activist,” not “anti-majoritarian” enough.
(The Alien and Sedition law was after all, an Act of Congress, the nearest thing
to a national majority.)79

To be sure, liberty and the avoidance of arbitrary rule, and safety against those working
through government were paramount concerns inculcated into the Constitution; it
pervaded the entire political spectrum in revolutionary America, and was further
amplified during reconstruction.
Shortly after the Civil War it became clear that passionate majorities working
through government, at the state level, would not be quelled easily. As a result, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, and subsequent reconstruction amendments emphasized the Union
over the individual states. Southern states relied on the states’-rights argument, which
was a decidedly more compelling argument prior to the Civil War. Indeed, “…Opponents
of the Civil Rights Act charged that it violated the Tenth Amendment, which ‘reserved to
the states’ those powers not granted to Congress…. Even [the bill’s] advocates
recognized the bill’s replacement of state with federal authority.”80 Senator Lot Morrill of
Maine plainly stated,
No nation, from the foundation of government, has ever undertaken to make a
legislative declaration so broad. Why? Because no nation hitherto has ever
cherished a liberty so universal. The ancient republics were all exceptional in
their liberty; they all had excepted classes, subjected classes, which were not the
subject of government, and, therefore, they could not so legislate. That it is
extraordinary and without a parallel in the history of this Government, or of any
other, does not affect the character of the declaration itself. The Senator from
Kentucky tells us that the proposition is revolutionary, and he thinks that is an
objection. I freely concede that it is revolutionary. I admit, that this species of
79
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legislation is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the midst of a
revolution? Is the Senator from Kentucky utterly oblivious to the grand results of
four years of war? Are we not in the midst of a civil and political revolution
which has changed the fundamental principles of our Government in some
respects?81

While an awareness of the counter-majoritarian difficulty helps to understand that
the Constitution was made with an eye to autonomy, and why the judiciary might
sometimes be called on, there is still a debate over at what level of detail provisions
should be abstracted. With the power to declare acts of legislatures void, courts are wary
of misappropriating constitutionally mandated powers. Theories range from a specific
application, to an acute adherence to precedent, to a living interpretation rooted in a
particular justice’s moral inclinations. Although the text is static, the vague nature of the
provisions allow for this wide range of methods. To solve the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, the next chapter discusses the ambitious business of interpreting a written
constitution.
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Chapter Two
In Pursuit of Judicial Restraint
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may
be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind…. Its nature,
therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.
- Chief Justice John Marshall
181982
If the counter-majoritarian difficulty poses the question, where is the line drawn
between majority rule and individual rights? Constitutional interpretation offers the
answer. Unfortunately, the answer is not as cut-and-dried as one might hope. Peter Irons
suggests that the Supreme Court is “a political institution, and constitutional litigation [is]
a form of politics.”83 He emphasizes this point with an observation made by Tocqueville:
“…Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner
or later, into a judicial question.”84 The nature of the Constitution and its construction
subject it fairly easily to the moral ideals that a justice may want to read into it, and this
has caused some consternation for a few justices and scholars. Professor Gordon Wood
notes,
There was not in 1787–1788—and today there is still not—one “correct” or
“true” meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution means whatever we want it
to mean. Of course, we cannot attribute any meaning we want and expect to get
away with it. We have to convince others of our “true” interpretation, and if we
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can convince enough people that that is the “true” interpretation, then so it
becomes. That is how the culture changes.85

It seems this almost-cynical view of the Constitution is not a rare one. In
criticizing an interpretive method that he did not agree with, Justice Brennan made the
point that “the political underpinnings of such a choice should not escape notice.”86 After
studying the subject for some time, Professor Mark Tushnet’s perspective went through a
rather dramatic change: “I no longer believe that constitutional theory constrains, or is
supposed to constrain judges. Rather…it serves primarily to provide a set of rhetorical
devices that judges can deploy as they believe effective.”87
As a result, many justices and legal scholars fear that too many courts are
replacing what the law is with their own moral idea of what the law ought to be.88 The
nature of “general propositions”89 laid out in the Constitution make this a palpable risk.
There is virtue in applying the law as it is known, as opposed to justices imbedding their
own personal convictions. Often referred to as judicial restraint, it is argued that this
most aptly occurs by the courts showing deference to the legislatures.90 Contrary to this is
judicial activism, which has taken on a pejorative tint; it implies that a justice has ignored
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the dictates of the Constitution and predicated their judgment on no more than their own
flighty discretion.
To be sure, restraint is important in maintaining a sense of legitimacy, but also
important is the court’s role in preventing a tyrannical majority from violating the
constitutional rights of a minority. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this point on
multiple occasions.91 If legislation conflicts with the Constitution, it becomes a federal
issue. In 1803 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “[A] law repugnant to the Constitution is
void, and [] courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” He
augmented the point, saying that if a state law which was repugnant to the Constitution
were not held as such by the courts that “[the Constitution] is prescribing limits, and
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”92 Of course, in the interest of
restraint, justices rightly remain cautious when reviewing legislation.
As it is relevant here, the question becomes, why does state prohibition of samesex marriage raise a constitutional question? If a theorist believes that it is not a
constitutional question they will maintain that the state legislatures should determine the
issue, but on the other hand, if a theorist believes it does raise a constitutional question
they will believe it is a federal issue and that the Supreme Court has the final word. The
debate over what the Constitution has to say about specific rights begins with
interpretation, and this is immediately problematic.
This seemingly benign act can be stifled by subjective interests, and often
subconsciously. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes observed of written law that “considering there
be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or some other
91
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passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure and has consequently the greatest
need of able interpreters.”93 The problem is further amplified by the manner in which the
Constitution was crafted.
While the debates over the Constitution and its Bill of Rights were lengthy and
enthusiastic, a desire to preserve the Union meant the focus was on “whether the
Constitution would be adopted, not [on] formulat[ing] definitive interpretations of its
individual clauses.”94 As a result, the Constitution with its Bill of Rights is largely a mix
of specific pragmatic rules and vague idealistic principles. Elucidating what exactly this
implies for constitutional controversies more than 220 years later has proved challenging.
Of the varied methods to interpret the Constitution, it is generally accepted that
they all more or less maintain one of two characteristics: what many call either a living
interpretation or a fixed interpretation. This, however, is something of a false dichotomy.
Not only is it too simplistic for a lucid analyzation, it is in many ways misleading, as
methods that are frequently referenced as fixed are just as living as their deeply criticized
counterparts.
The method that a justice uses seems to be allied with how they conceive their
role vis-à-vis the Constitution. This perceived role is largely dependent on where they
believe the authority of a constitution arises, which in turn establishes their perception of
the Constitution’s role “in defining and limiting the authority and powers of
government.”95 There are essentially six models of how to interpret the Constitution, 96
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but they can all more-or-less be distilled into three categories. For clarity, and what might
be slightly more helpful to this analysis, Professor Robert Post’s model will be used. He
separates the possibilities into, “‘Authority of Law,’ governed by doctrine… ‘Authority
of Ethos,’ governed by morality… [and] ‘Authority of Consent,’ governed by history.”97

I. Authority of Ethos

Those that believe the Constitution derives its authority from ideas of “dignity”98
or “humanity,” essentially words suffused with moral inclinations, might be said to
subscribe to an “Authority of Ethos.” They believe a constitution should be responsive to
“current problems and current needs.”99 These interpretive methods “engage[] in an
ongoing process of national self-definition.”100 This would be what people generally refer
to as a living or evolving constitution. These theorists fear that using an interpretive
method fixed too rigidly will needlessly submit the polity to detrimental, yet ostensibly
avoidable outcomes; specifically, it is argued that politically vulnerable minorities will be
at the mercy of a majority.
Society inevitably changes and, as the argument goes, adhering to anachronistic
law can only serve to impede progress. Indeed, “[t]hose who would restrict claims of
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right to the values of 1789… turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew adaption of
overarching principles to changes of social circumstance.”101
Madison made the point that “in framing [the Constitution] which we wish to last
for ages, we shd.[sic] not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.”102 Those
changes, it is agreed, are generally effected most faithfully through the legislatures, but
ultimately court rulings have consequences today, and according to the moral interpreter,
those consequences should not be ignored. The change in society requires justices to ask,
“what do the words of the text mean in our time?”103 This evolving interpretive ethos can
best be characterized by the majority opinion in 1958’s Trop v. Dulles: “the words of the
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and [] their scope is not static. The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.”104
Those who claim to subscribe, (or are sometimes accused of subscribing), to an
Authority of Ethos have often been on the liberal wing of the Supreme Court in recent
decades. While some might enjoy the fruits of these rulings, the debate over those
methods that allow for moral inclinations center on the idea that not everyone holds the
same values. Justice Scalia, who emphatically claims not to be a moral reader, issues
opinions that demonstrate quite the opposite. His conceptions of the Constitution’s
establishment clause and the cruel and unusual punishment clause have been thoroughly
dismantled, and exposed as moral “distortion[s] of the Constitution.”105
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The infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford case was decided by what the justices
thought was best for society. The Supreme Court ruled that because the plaintiff was a
slave, he did not have standing to sue in court. The declaration that the court did not have
jurisdiction should have been the end of the case, but instead Chief Justice Taney went on
to decide the second question of the case. He ruled that Congress did not have the power
to prohibit slavery in territories and therefore Congress’s provision in the Missouri
Compromise declaring it a free territory was unconstitutional. As Robert Burt noted, the
ruling was fraught with “the most explicit racist dogma that appears anywhere, before or
since his opinion.” Moral inclinations had infected the court’s judgment. Consequently,
“of all the repudiated decisions, Dred Scott carries the deepest stigma,” and is the most
“reviled.” 106
Moral decisions have of course come in a wide variety and are not always so
disagreeable. The problem is that morals-based adjudication weakens any sense of
legitimacy; it becomes a partisan tool for politics. Two similar cases might be decided
differently based on no more than a justice’s personal feelings. Expressed by John Adams
in the Constitution for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, stability and predictability
in law allows a government to be one of “laws and not of men.” That is, it allows laws to
apply evenly to individuals, irrespective of personal traits.
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II. Authority of Law

Perhaps the most restrained a justice can be is by using the doctrine of precedent,
or more formally, stare decisis. It is a vestige of the Common Law system whereby a law
is expounded in one case and is forever a reference for future cases of similar
circumstance. It gives the most deference to what has already been made law. Because it
is self-referential, it has the unique characteristic of being imperative in avoiding
arbitrary rule. Unlike adjudicating based on morals, it allows courts to apply the law in a
predictable fashion establishing some sense of legitimacy. Citizens are able to reasonably
plan their affairs and hence the legal framework maintains value.107
For this reason, questions of constitutional validity are usually decided by
precedent rather than a scrutinizing look at the Constitution itself. After all, “…If the
most powerful justification for the Constitution's authority is that it is law, and the most
defensible justification for judicial review is that it is the peculiar province and duty of
the courts to expound the law,”108 then once that law has been developed, the courts are
required to follow it. Courts, in this sense, are able to keep discretion to a minimum and
act as “mere instruments of the law.”109 It is generally the more controversial issues that
have a lack of precedent to fall back on and require a fresh look at the Constitution.
Even when the law has seemingly been decided in one case, precedent is not
foolproof and in fact can be problematic. Justices are human and humans are fallible, yet
in subsequent cases, “the determination of similarity or difference is the function of each
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judge.”110 That is, precedent is fundamentally analogical, rather than logical.111 Mistakes
can be made and determining when a mistake has been made is not absolute. It can very
well be a matter of contention between justices; consequently, justices are known to
never be acutely bound by precedent.
To be sure, precedent is important, but imperfect. It allows for what might be
deemed a correction in a previously held case, and it provides a bouquet of decisions
from which to quote. As Justice Scalia points out, “…In the narrowest sense…the
holding of a case cannot go beyond the facts that were before the court,” and when they
want to, “courts will squint narrowly when they wish to avoid an earlier decision.”112 It
can in this sense become just as flimsy as an interpretation based on a judge’s moral
tendencies.
Of course, as with all human enterprises the legal system is developed through a
continual process of learning through experience. Justice Brandeis observed the
importance of precedent and its subservience to lessons learned in 1932:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right…
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically
impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to
the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in
the judicial function.113
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While precedent might provide an out for justices wishing to avoid or overturn
previous decisions, it is important not to confuse “experience and the force of better
reasoning” with judicial activism. A justice doing what they want in spite of
constitutional mandates is entirely distinct from learning that they were previously wrong
about those mandates, and remedying the situation.

III. Authority of Consent

Those methods that purport to derive their conclusions from consent do so by
looking at the historical intention or understanding of provisions. It is believed by many
that this is the best way to find legitimate authority. By looking at what the ratifiers
intended a constitutional provision to do, or what the original public understanding would
have yielded, the people’s consent that defines the law should be discernable, hence the
name: Authority of Consent. Within the literature these methods often go by the name of
Originalism. It comes in more than one flavor, but its purpose is to act as security from an
overzealous judiciary usurping the power of the people and injecting their own moral
ideals into a court decision. If the Constitution does not act as a restraint on judges then
“[they] could govern areas not committed to them by specific clauses of the Constitution,
there would be no law other than the will of the judge.”114
To be faithful to the Originalist doctrine a theorist must be able to demonstrate
that their claim is based on “some textual or historical evidence.”115 Originalism
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recognizes the importance of consent of the governed, and because legislation might be
subjected to judicial review, it “legitimizes” the process.116 The Constitution might have
evolving characteristics but the Originalist does not see a “basis for believing that
supervision of the evolution would have been committed to the courts.”117 Instead, it is
believed that change is most legitimately effected through the legislatures:
[O]rginalism seems…more compatible with the nature and purpose of a
Constitution in a democratic system. A democratic society does not, by and large,
need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect “current values.”
Elections take care of that quite well.118

This is the essence of the originalist argument. If society wants change, they can elect
new representatives that will pass legislation in line with that change. To ask the courts
for moral guidance can very well result in decisions like Dred Scott. To argue that the
Constitution is not law, or is not binding subjects society to the moral predilections of the
courts. Justice Rehnquist made the point, “there is no conceivable way in which I can
logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the
judgments of your conscience, and vice versa.”119
Scalia has further made the salient point that the “purpose of constitutional
guarantees” is to inhibit undesirable change in those original values that those who
adopted the amendment saw fit to instill in the Constitution. If society wants to change
one of these fundamental values, it must “devote to the subject the long and hard
consideration required for a constitutional amendment before those particular values can
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be cast aside.”120 The justice “has, after all, taken an oath to apply the laws and has been
given no power to supplant them with rules of his own…if [a justice] feels strongly
enough he can…[resign and] lead a political campaign…and if that fails, lead a
revolution. But rewrite the laws he cannot do.”121 For the government to reflect a change
in society’s moral values, that change must occur through constitutional amendment, not
the courts. Of course, it should also be noted that change should not occur through defiant
states either.
Originalism makes some salient points, but the bigger argument arises in regards
to how specific Originalism should get. Too specific and it would require a court to
uphold a flogging statute and allow school segregation, (as the ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment continued to segregate school districts well after its adoption), however if
provisions are read too broadly, progressive tax laws or even age requirements for driving
wouldn’t stand up to the Equal Protection Clause.
Originalism has its merits; after all, completely ignoring the dictates of the
Constitution would produce chaos. It is faithful, it is enduring, and it most likely has a
manifestation that can produce something close to impartial results. The problem,
however, is that the versions espoused by those of Scalia, Bork, and many others are not
it. Enacted at too specific a level produces a version of Originalism that is wholly
impracticable, and usually a euphemism for moral interpretation.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky writes, “[w]hat disturbs me about Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence is that by denying that it is making value choices, it pretends that its
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decisions are a result of a neutral judicial methodology.”122 As this paper refers to
Originalism it will be of the kind that is of Bork and Scalia.
Originalism, whether it is based on original intent as Judge Bork would prefer or
the original public understanding (sometimes called textualism)123 as Justice Scalia would
prefer, runs into several problems. Those covered here are: (1) there are instances where
even the most conservative justices will not implement statutes that were perfectly
constitutional at the time a law was adopted, making it no different than a moral
interpretation; (2) originalists aim to find some kind of historical consensus at a very
specific level beyond the explicit words adopted; and (3) although it will make a claim to
the contrary, Originalism does not have the ability to cope with new phenomena, from
changes in technology to changes in society. Two of these problems will be addressed
here, and the third in Chapter Three.
To address the first point: Originalists congratulate themselves for belonging to a
school of thought that is the pinnacle of judicial restraint and they chastise courts, and
other justices, who do not subscribe to such a specific level of abstraction, as judicial
activists. However, its impracticable nature requires just enough modification to nullify
its existence: it becomes undergirded by moral relativism. Justice Scalia, one of
Originalism’s most vociferous proponents, concedes that there is a problem with
application if we know exactly what an originalist answer will provide, but find it
morally repugnant:

122

Erwin Chemerinsky, “The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal,” 22 University of
Hawai’i Law Review, (2000): 385.
123
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, (1997).

40

I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I
cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.124

This is fine for many justices, but if the sole justification for maintaining an
eighteenth or nineteenth century mindset is legitimacy, then what excuse, aside from
moral relativism, is there to not uphold a flogging statute? The statement annuls any
sense of judicial restraint. For a restrained interpreter to pull even a single punch, such as
not upholding a flogging statute based on a moral decision, makes every other decision a
moral choice. Death penalty? Scalia does not morally deem it worthy of pulling a punch.
Sodomy laws? Scalia does not morally deem it worthy of pulling a punch, (and he offers
scathing dissents despite his own admission of being a moral interpreter).125
In some cases, such as flogging, the originalist interpreter would no doubt look to
precedent to justify why they will not uphold the statute. However, making that decision
–when to use and when not to use precedent, or when to squint narrowly – is a moral one.
As Professor Lawrence Tribe has written,
Justice Scalia asserts that his assumption of the power to invoke stare decisis or
not to do so does not leave him open to the charge of importing his own views
and values into his method of interpretation, because he follows “rules” as to
when the disregard of stare decisis is appropriate. But even if we assume that
Justice Scalia has such “rules” for the selective invocation of stare decisis, and
for whether to uphold some but not all erroneous decisions of the Supreme Court,
what is the origin of those rules? They certainly are not derived from the
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“original meaning” of the text of the Constitution, as Justice Scalia’s interpretive
methodology would require.126

Scalia’s concession about being a faint-hearted originalist also shows the irony in
this account of the Constitution. Flogging is brutal, as is ear clipping, but to hold that they
are not constitutional under any circumstances while simultaneously holding that capital
punishment is easily constitutional,127 would likely be deemed morally incongruous by
many people.
This of course is only in application, and there is still the question of theory.
Some will inquire as to the practicability of Originalism if a good-faith effort is engaged;
that is, if a person were to hold a flogging statute as constitutional, as well as earclipping, segregation, and so on, would Originalism be practicable, and therefore the
most legitimate interpretation of our Constitution? This, however, is an impossibility, as
there was no originally agreed-upon understanding. This leads to the second point that
Chief Justice Marshall articulated, “historians can never forget that it is a debate they are
interpreting.”128
Advocates of a specific level of Originalism concede that finding the original
meaning is a challenge, and will offer their insights as to what the enterprise entails.
Unfortunately, the challenge masks the incoherent nature of supposedly determinate
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answers. Judge Robert Bork, a proponent of intent Originalism, offered a laundry list of
places to uncover the original meaning:
records of the Philadelphia convention, records of ratifying conventions, the
newspaper accounts of the day, the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist Papers,
the constructions put upon the Constitution be early Congresses...executive
branch officials...and...courts, as well as treatises by men who, like Joseph Story,
were thoroughly familiar with the thought of the time.129

Beyond that, Justice Scalia concluded that to properly ascertain an original meaning,
[I]s often exceedingly difficult.... Properly done, the task requires the
consideration of an enormous mass of material – in the case of the Constitution
and its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the records of
the ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation
of the reliability of that material—many of the reports of the ratifying debates,
for example, are thought to be quite unreliable. And further still, it requires
immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time—
somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did
not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that
are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the
historian than the lawyer.130

Ironically, it is the historians that point to the futility of Originalism. Gordon
Wood has observed, “it may be a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a
‘correct’ or ‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution, in order to carry on their
business.”131 Jack Rakove continued this line of thought and added that the most
important task for historians “is to explain why ‘contrasting meanings’ were attached to
the Constitution from its inception.”132 The dean of American constitutional historians,
Leonard Levy made it very clear,

129

Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, (New York, NY:
Touchstone, 1990), chapter 8, para. 12, Kindle edition.
130
Scalia, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System,” (1997), (emphasis mine).
131
Wood, “Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America,” (1987).
132
Rakove, Original Meanings, 9.

43

[T]he Supreme Court’s use of originalist evidence is best described as a mix of
“law office history” and justificatory rhetoric which offers little reason to think
that this method of interpretation can provide the faithful and accurate
application of the original constitutional understandings its advocates promise.133

The burden of discovering the original meaning of the provision in question is claimed to
be “largely [a] factual matter requiring none of the moral and political reasoning
appropriately undertaken by the creators of the constitution.”134 This, however, does not
align with the facts. Looking for specific conclusions can produce numerous results from
numerous individuals, but to claim that there was a consensus at such a specific level that
can be reliably drawn from is intellectually dishonest. Having numerous individuals from
which to pull allows a person to search legislative history and selectively pick the parts
that support their point, or as Judge Harold Leventhal put it, it is like “looking over the
crowd and picking your friends.”135 As will be established later, Judge Bork’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is depictive of this problem.
In the Annals of Congress, Madison is noted as advising the framers “not to
inquire into the details behind ‘abstract propositions, of which judgment may not be
convinced.... [I]f we confine ourselves to an enumeration of simple, acknowledged
principles, the ratification will meet with but little difficulty.”136 Without a consensus,
what becomes constitutionally valid is contingent upon who is being quoted. In that
sense, it is no more stable than a moral interpretation.
133
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As an example we can look at what is often considered one of the most concretely
understood amendments: the First Amendment. The First Amendment prohibits the
“abridge[ment] [of] the freedom of speech” among other things. It would be remarkably
difficult to argue that there was a concrete consensus on the understanding or intention of
the First Amendment when it was first adopted. Only eight years later there was
significant debate by its ratifiers as to its meaning. The dominant Federalist Party enacted
the Sedition Act in 1798 and argued “that the freedom of speech meant only freedom
from prior restraint—in effect, freedom from an advance prohibition—and did not
include any protection at all from punishment after publication.”137 Precedent may inform
us as to exactly what the provision entails today, but that is certainly not an originalist
approach, and invoking precedent here, but not elsewhere, is a patently moral decision.
Further, Justice Scalia uses the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment clause as a kind of acid test for fitness of character to even be a judge. He
believes any judge who is prepared to strike down capital punishment under any scenario
– even in the case of “actual innocence”138 – should resign instead of “sabotage[] death
penalty cases.”139 The history of the debate over the Eighth Amendment – the original
understanding – shows that they were well aware that the Supreme Court might use its
own discretion in such matters, and could even deem capital punishment, flogging,
whipping, and ear clipping as cruel and unusual.140
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Indeed, finding an original consensus is not always easy, but worse is when an
originalist believes they have found a consensus at a specific level and apply the
provision in a manner antithetical to its purpose. One of the hardest arguments for
Originalists to reconcile is the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. As the facts are
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed and that same Congress segregated the
Washington D.C. school district, there is a general consensus amongst constitutional law
scholars that at least one reason Originalism in the specific sense is problematic is that it
cannot explain the Brown decision.141 In defense of intent-Originalism Judge Bork
explained why it does in fact work with his version. To do this, however, he abandons his
own method and views the Fourteenth Amendment at a broader view. In his book The
Tempting of America, he writes:
By 1954, when Brown came up for decision, it had been apparent for some time
that segregation rarely if ever produced equality … the physical facilities
provided for blacks were not as good as those provided for whites. That had been
demonstrated in a long series of cases … The Court's realistic choice, therefore,
was either to abandon the quest for equality by allowing segregation or to forbid
segregation in order to achieve equality. There was no third choice. Either choice
would violate one aspect of the original understanding, but there was no
possibility of avoiding that. Since equality and segregation were mutually
inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be
honored. When that is seen, it is obvious the Court must choose equality and
prohibit state-imposed segregation. The purpose that brought the fourteenth
amendment into being was equality before the law, and equality, not separation,
was written into the law.142
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Judge Bork is correct. To choose segregation, just because the ratifiers thought it
was permissible, and because it was within the moral perceptions of the time is to ignore
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. The new knowledge that separate but equal
did not produce equality meant that segregation was inarguably violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. The state legislatures and the justices in Plessy v. Ferguson143 did not know
this, but as Chapter Three will explore, that is the nature of facts – there is a distinction
between what we know and what we believe we know.
Judicial restraint is important, and some form of Originalism might have it. But
considering at a specific level (a) there is a lack of consensus imbedded in constitutional
provisions, and considering (b) the ability to choose when to use precedent, and
particularly detrimental to its case is (c) the fact that it can lead to implementing statutes
which are explicitly antipodal to the purpose of an amendment, any argument for
adhering to the specifics of an eighteenth or nineteenth century mindset seems
considerably weakened.
Interpretation is not black and white. The Constitution cannot be read as literal
and absolute, like radio instructions. If it were then laws against perjury would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and individuals would be permitted to
acquire nuclear weapons under the Second Amendment. The process of elucidating what
the Constitution holds often seems to succumb to Tushnet’s assessment that justices use it
more as a rhetorical device to find their preferred conclusions. This, however, might be
somewhat hyperbolic. It seems that if justices can find a level of abstraction – even a
version of Originalism – that allows them to stay consistent over time, they might be able
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to show the restraint that they are after. That is, if a justice subscribes to Originalism and
in one case uses an exacting specification to hold up something like flogging, but in
another instance allows the text to adapt and strikes down segregation laws, then they are
not being consistent and not showing restraint. They are essentially hiding behind
Originalism to invoke their moral decisions. Professor Herbert Wechsler articulated this
point when he asked:
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case they have before
them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality,
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply?
Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other
cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating any principle
144
avowed?

More recently the point was articulated by Gene R. Nichol, “constitutional theories are
meant to be applied to cases in which we like the results and to cases in which we dislike
the results.”145
The debate over interpretation is unlikely to be solved any time soon. What can be
asserted is that for any method of interpretation to claim fidelity to the Constitution, it
requires some level of analysis that allows for the specifics to change, but not the purpose
of the amendment. Chapter Three will address why change is inevitable and Chapter Four
will discuss the Equal Protection Clause in light of its original construction.
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Chapter Three
Inevitable Evolution & Epistemology
[W]e may add that, when we are dealing with words that also are a
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters…. The
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago…. We must
consider what this country has become in deciding what that amendment
has reserved.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1920146
The debate over whether a change to the Constitution is more faithfully executed
in the courts or the legislatures usually begins with a discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty and ends with the idea that since the government derives its power
from the people, change should most often occur in the legislatures. What this point
misses is that sometimes there is no change, only a mistake about the facts.
In Judge Bork’s Brown example, segregation never did produce equality. That
was the fact regardless of what the ratifiers believed the facts to be. Once that became
obvious the legislatures had an obligation to bring their legislation in line with the
Constitution and if it ended up in court, the court had an obligation to overturn it.
The facts did not change, only what the legislatures and courts knew about the
facts. In this case, it would certainly be preferable for the legislatures to remove
legislation that is repugnant to the Constitution, but if the courts should find themselves
with a case in front of them where state legislation is inarguably repugnant to the
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Constitution, they don’t have a choice but to strike it down. As it was stated in Chapter
Two, there is a cogent difference between judicial activism, and learning that a mistake
was made and remedying the situation.
The point that Bork made, that although “equality and segregation were mutually
inconsistent…the ratifiers did not understand that,” is the epistemological point. New
facts change the reference but not the meaning of Constitutional provisions. The meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment never changed, but once it was discovered that segregation
did not in fact produce equality, the reference of the Fourteenth Amendment changed. As
Bork concludes, “…The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being was
equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was written into the law.”147
Arguing a similar point, British economist and political philosopher Friedrich
Hayek argued in 1960 that the treatment of homosexuality was “[t]he most conspicuous
instance of” illegitimate state coercion.148 He then approvingly quotes Bertrand Russell,
and adds his own point,
…“if it were still believed, as it once was, that the toleration of such behavior
would expose the community to the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, the
community would have every right to intervene.” But where such factual beliefs
do not prevail, private practice among adults, however abhorrent it may be to the
majority, is not a proper subject for coercive action for a state whose object is to
minimize coercion.149

Hayek’s point, that learning new facts necessarily changes the implications of proper
state coercion is not a small one. This leads to a point that is the meat of why
constitutional provisions will change their reference without changing their meaning, and
147
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happens regardless of whether society or the legal system acknowledges it. Change in
reference is a consequence of gaining knowledge, and is no more preventable than the
progression of time. Without allowing room to expand, the Constitution would become
brittle, ineffectual and irrelevant. This point might be deemed living by some, but
interestingly, even the most professedly restrained and often conservative justices
concede this point.
Scalia refers to a trajectory he looks for when a case involves “new phenomena:”
How, for example, does the First Amendment guarantee of “the freedom of
speech” apply to new technologies that did not exist when the guarantee was
created—to sound trucks, or to government-licensed over-the-air television? In
such new fields the Court must follow the trajectory of the First Amendment, so
to speak, to determine what it requires—and assuredly that enterprise is not
entirely cut-and-dried by requires the exercise of judgment.150

He clarifies this trajectory idea later in his book,
I…believe that the Eighth Amendment is no mere “concrete and dated rule” but
rather an abstract principle. If I did not hold this belief, I would not be able to
apply the Eighth Amendment (as I assuredly do) to all sorts of tortures quite
unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.151

Judge Bork says,
[C]ourts must not hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances. A judge who
refuses to deal with unforeseen threats to an established constitutional value, and
hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair, and
reasonable meaning, fails his judicial duty.152
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Of course, he goes on to warn that “[i]n stating the value that is to be protected, the judge
must not state it with so much generality that he transforms it.”153
He says the idea of applying old values to new circumstances is why “electronic
media” is covered by the First Amendment, electronic surveillance is prohibited in
certain cases by the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and even why the Commerce Clause is applied to state regulation of interstate
trucking;154 it is because the reference of the Constitution expands. Former Attorney
General and originalist, Edwin Meese’s assessment was simple and to the point:
Where the language of the Constitution is specific, it must be obeyed. Where
there is a demonstrable consensus among the Framers and ratifiers as to a
principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed. Where
there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional
provision, it should be interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not
contradict the Constitution itself.155

This concept might open up the Constitution to imputing moral standards, but ultimately
the idea is the inevitable consequence of a static document being applied to a society that
incurs change independent of the government. While there is usually no single original
consensus in a specific sense, it seems that moral inclinations can be minimized by at
least understanding the original purpose at a broad level. This way the virtue of restraint
can be realized through consistent application over time.
A document that is meant to remain applicable over a long period will necessarily
have its reference broadened, and the Fourteenth Amendment is no different than the
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First or Eighth Amendments. The reference of the “freedom of speech,” or “cruel and
unusual punishment,” is extended to “new phenomena” such as radio, television, or
“tortures quite unknown.” The reference of the Amendments are expanded because of
new technological facts, and as Judge Bork’s point demonstrated, if there are similarly
social facts that emerge as a result of gaining knowledge, there would be a change to the
reference of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Adele Mercier points out, “[s]ocial
facts may have a different aetiology than natural and technological facts…but they are
ontologically on par as facts.”156
If the courts were ever convinced that separate-but-equal actually resulted in
equality, by 1954 it had become known as a matter-of-fact that it did not. Any
“anticipation that it would…was simply a mistake about the facts.”157 In the choice
between adhering to the purpose of the amendment with the consideration of new facts or
upholding a statute that would require disregarding new facts, Bork concludes that the
court must choose the former. This explains why Brown, Loving, and Reed cannot be
deemed judicial activism, but rather exactly in line with the purpose of the amendment.
Similar to segregation, new social facts have emerged about interracial marriage, women
and now sexual orientation.
Importantly there is a distinction to make between an object, and knowledge as it
pertains to that object. Using Scalia’s trajectory metaphor, segregation is an institution
with which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar, but it was the
knowledge that it did not produce equality that changed the institution as it related to the
amendment. The trajectory of the amendment did not change, but the knowledge that
156
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separate but equal did not produce equality moved segregation into the trajectory of the
amendment. That is, the meaning of the amendment did not change, but its reference did.
To elucidate the difference, Mercier gives an example, “If I live on an island where there
are only maples and pines, and so I have only applied the word ‘tree’ to maples and
pines, that nowise means that when I visit the mainland and bump into a beech, I cannot,
or even ought not, call it a tree.”158 The new knowledge expands the reference of the
word “tree.”
The same can be said for the Reed decision, which in 1971 said women were
constitutionally equal to men. Women – the object – were of course not new, but the
knowledge that they were equally as capable as men was new information, assuming the
honesty of the assessments contemporary men gave of women. Note that this says
nothing about the open mindedness of people, as it could have certainly been figured out
before 1971 that women were equal to men, but it was not until then that the Court
recognized the fact.
In 1869 Mill criticized the argument that women were naturally inferior to men
and should be dissuaded from participating in certain activities. He rightly argued that
“…Until conditions of equality exist, no one can possibly assess the natural differences
between women and men, distorted as they have been.”159 In his view, such a confident
declaration cannot be made without evidence. Mill made this point four years before the
U.S. Supreme Court was writing, “…The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
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belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life,”160
and forty-two years before it was argued that “Woman is woman. She can not unsex
herself or change her sphere. Let her be content with her lot and perform those high
duties intended for her by the Great Creator, and she will accomplish far more in
governmental affairs than she can ever accomplish by mixing up in the dirty pool of
politics.”161
Segregation did not produce equality, “though the ratifiers did not understand
that.” Women are as capable as men, “though the ratifiers did not understand that.”
Sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic and same-sex marriage will not harm
society, “though the ratifiers did not understand that.” These are all social facts and as
Mercier points out, “the facts were the facts regardless of what we believed them to
be.”162
In the nineteenth century the facts about sexual orientation and same-sex marriage
were wrong or non-existent. Arguing against the pillory in 1816, Michael Taylor noted
that “no punishment, however severe, appeared to deter persons addicted to this atrocious
offense.”163 While “homosexual subcultures[] certainly existed, even thrived” in the mid
to late nineteenth century, they “existed in isolation and near invisibility.” This did not
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change in the United States until the end of the nineteenth century,164 but certainly not
before the reconstruction amendments were adopted. Even as late as the 1890s educated
contemporaries were unaware of the distinction between a sexual act and a sexual
orientation. The trial of Oscar Wilde for “gross indecency” demonstrates this. The
judge’s condemnation reverberates with this unawareness:
The crime of which you have been convicted is so bad that one has to put stern
restraint upon one’s self to prevent one’s self from describing… the sentiments
which must rise to the breast of every man of honor who has heard the details of
these two terrible trials…. It is of no use for me to address you. People who can
do these things must be dead to all sense of shame, and one cannot hope to
produce any effect upon them. It is the worst case I have ever tried…. I shall,
under the circumstances, be expected to pass the severest sentence that the law
allows. In my judgment it is totally inadequate for such a case as this.165

That sexual orientation cannot only be different in different people, but that it is
an immutable characteristic would have been a surprise to many. This fact though, has
always been the case. Where it implicates the Constitution is where that fact is unearthed
and sexual orientation becomes part of a descriptive trait of a person, the way hair color,
race, or height are.
This leads to two points: (1) if same-sex marriage had been discussed during the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, it would have been deemed negative and would
not have been included under the Equal Protection Clause. However, just like
segregation, the ascertainment of new knowledge changes constitutional implications. To
ask what ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have thought about same-sex
marriage and to do this by projecting backwards the sole idea of same-sex marriage
without the accompanying facts that have been well established over the last half-century
164
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is specious reasoning. It would be similar to asking what the 39th Congress might have
thought about internet legislation without assuming proper knowledge of a computer;
assuming their position on a question without assuming knowledge of facts that define it
produces a nonsensical and irrelevant result. And (2) same-sex marriage was not
considered. Bearing in mind the utter lack of knowledge about sexual orientation, samesex marriage would be more akin to a new phenomena for which the trajectory would
have to be ascertained.
When the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment pronounced that all persons
would be treated equally under the law, they certainly did not conceive of every
difference between individuals, nor could they have rationally been expected to do so.
The argument that because sexual orientation was not considered during the debates over
the Equal Protection Clause and therefore it has not been decided by the people that it
should be protected, is incorrect. It has been decided. There are an infinite amount of
personal qualities that can be said to have not gone through the minds of those ratifiers.
All a person need do is ponder what the argument would be if it were over a trait
considered benign, such as hair color.
In a hypothetical thought experiment, if red hair had been completely unknown to
the ratifiers and one day in the twentieth century a red-haired child were born, would that
child not deserve equal protection of the laws? The question is bizarre. Just because they
did not consider a trait is not sufficient to remove it from equal protection. It seems the
reason that sexual orientation is on the chopping block is three-fold: (1) sexual
orientation implies behavior, (2) that behavior concerns sex, and (3) that sexual behavior
was illegal at the time of ratification.
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The fact that it implies behavior is moot, unless that behavior creates a rational
basis for not applying the amendment. For example, psychosis may be immutable, but the
behavior it implies provides a rational basis for proscribing action based on that
characteristic. On the other hand if the thought experiment concerned obesity – certainly
something that implies behavior (and usually has some aspect of choice) – it is doubtful
that there would there be a weight limit for equal protection. Perhaps an even closer
analogy would be something similar to ADHD. ADHD implies behavior and might be an
immutable characteristic, which the ratifiers would not have considered but those with
ADHD are not suddenly uncovered nor is their behavior – as long as there is no rational
basis for its proscription. A person may argue that the difference is that the actions
implicit with ADHD – perhaps talking quickly, or losing train of thought – were not
illegal in 1868, whereas sodomy was. This ignores the implication of new knowledge,
(and the effect of new knowledge on static provisions as demonstrated by the segregation
example). When it became evident that sexual orientation is immutable and part of the
person, the Supreme Court was forced to change its reading of the Equal Protection
Clause. Whereas the sodomite was seen as person + s, where s is a crime like any other,
the homosexual is seen as just person, and certainly person is what the Equal Protection
Clause was meant to cover.
As familiarity with sexual orientation grew, states overturned their discriminatory
legislation, which “brand[ed] all homosexuals as criminals”166 and in those states that
failed to do so, the Supreme Court appropriately stepped in and did its job of defending
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the Constitution.167 The Supreme Court has readily acknowledged this in the language of
Romer v. Evans when Justice Kennedy wrote that the Equal Protection Clause is “a
commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake,”168 and
subsequently struck down a provision in Colorado’s state constitution because it violated
the rights of persons with a non-heterosexual sexual orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas the
wording similarly expresses this sentiment: “[t]hose harmed by this law are people who
have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior
prohibited.”169 The new knowledge added sexual orientation to the definition of person
and changed the reference of the amendment in the same way new knowledge about
segregation or new knowledge about technology expands the reference of those
respective amendments. It was then affirmed in 2010, that the Supreme Court’s
“decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of
sexual orientation.]170
The unique fight that sexual orientation has had of whether it is immutable, it
seems, is what opposition to gay rights turns on. Considering that orientation is an
immutable trait inseparable from the person, whether it was known at the time or not, the
gay population is necessarily covered by the Equal Protection Clause, and the case of
same-sex marriage, then, does in fact at least raise a question that belongs in the Supreme
167
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Court. In the Supreme Court the question will be in regards to whether same-sex and
different-sex marriages are equivalent in the relevant areas as it pertains to the state. This
will be answered in Chapter Six.
If state laws that implement segregation or prohibit same-sex marriage are
discovered to violate equal protection the only way they would be able to surmount the
Fourteenth Amendment would be to further amend the Constitution. After all,
segregation, or the prohibition of same-sex marriage, were not what was debated,
thoughtfully considered, and added as an amendment – equal protection was. In that vein
President George W. Bush gave a speech in favor of a constitutional amendment saying
that marriage would only be recognized between one man and one woman; this would in
fact overcome the Equal Protection Clause. Opponents to same-sex marriage have the
government at their disposal, but in the words of Justice Scalia, “rewrite the laws they
cannot do.”171
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PART TWO
Chapter Four
Passions and Prejudice
If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it
will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1922172
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
1913173
Regardless of the interpretive method used, all theorists acknowledge that there
must be some room for change in reference to accommodate new phenomena. The
knowledge of sexual orientation and the concept of same-sex marriage are new in the
U.S., and although new social facts are no different than technological facts,
ontologically speaking, some will ignore the dictates that they have set for new
phenomena and plainly argue that because homosexuality in some form was around, and
because it was not considered during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that an
expansion of the amendment cannot support sexual orientation.
When addressing how general a provision can be read, according to intentOriginalism, Judge Bork gives the following hypothetical:
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Assume for the sake of the argument that a judge’s study of the evidence shows
that both black and general racial equality were clearly intended, but that equality
on matters such as sexual orientation was not under discussion.
The [intent originalist] may conclude that he can enforce black and racial
equality but that he had no guidance at all about any higher level of generality.
He has, therefore, no warrant to displace a legislative choice that prohibits certain
forms of sexual behavior.174

To be sure, the conception that the Fourteenth Amendment makes particular distinctions
in its allotment for equal protection is a conception that Bork, Scalia, and others have
propounded for decades. As this chapter discusses, it is incorrect. The ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment had the opportunity to make the amendment specific to race, but
they struck it down for an amendment that would cover all persons. They didn’t parse
equal protection into categories, make a mistake, or carelessly leave it too broad. It is
meant to assure that all laws apply to all persons equally.
Some will argue that the term equality is too vague to elicit anything concrete.
While there are different conceptions and scopes of equality, that which is laid down in
the Fourteenth Amendment has a specific meaning, and like all laws described with
words, there are boundaries which do not require a treatise on the word to discern.
Kurt Vonnegut’s opening to “Harrison Bergeron” begins,
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal
before God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter
than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was
stronger or quicker than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th,
212th, and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance
of agents of the United States Handicapper General.175
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This, it should be obvious, is not the conception that the ratifiers had in mind. Some will
throw their hands up as if to say the pursuit for equality is a fruitless one. Simply put, the
equality provision in the Fourteenth Amendment is similar to that of Hayek’s equality
requirement in his conception of the rule of law: “equality prohibit[s] the enactment of
laws that ma[ke] arbitrary distinctions among people.”176 Just like the First Amendment
that guarantees freedom of speech – there are exceptions. In the case of the First
Amendment it might be perjury laws, in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment it might
be age restrictions on driving, or taxation laws. But these exceptions are not arbitrary and
therefore do not confuse the word – it is not a nebulous concept; although some will
become distracted with such semantic debates.177
The Equal Protection Clause was “in every draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”178 It’s construction was volatile to be sure, but it is clear that it was never
meant to be restricted to race legislation alone. Judge Bork disagrees with this, and to
find his evidence in history he quotes the infamous Slaughter-House Cases. In 1873
Justice Miller wrote,
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause.]179

Judge Bork concludes from this, that “[t]he fourteenth amendment … had little
reach beyond the protection of those who had been slaves…. In a word, the history of the
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fourteenth amendment gave judges no guidance on any subject other than the protection
of blacks. Beyond that the justices had nothing more to apply than their personal
views.”180
Of course, as it has been established precedent is imperfect. Dealing with any of
the reconstruction amendments takes special care, as there are multiple examples of
legislatures and courts invoking their own moral ideas at the expense of the
Constitution,181 and few amendments have brought forth the infighting and misperception
as the Fourteenth Amendment. Still, it is awkward that Bork would use a court opinion so
reviled that “[v]irtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that
[the Slaughter-House interpretation] is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”182
First, it deserves mention that Bork is not being completely forthright with the
quote he is using. It is accurate, and it was put forward in the Slaughter-House opinion,
but in the following sentence the court says even though they do not think the Equal
Protection Clause is relevant in this case, they feel that the question of whether it relates
to persons other than blacks is not a matter that concerns them at the present moment and
that until “some case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice…shall have claimed a
decision at our hands” the court “may safely leave the matter alone.”183 Several years
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later when the question was answered by the court the same justice Miller joined the
majority opinions that affirmed the Equal Protection Clause applied to all persons.184
Second, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment does not support Bork’s
reading. While legislative history will allow a person to “pick their friends,” there is no
logical way a person familiar with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment can come to
his conclusion. The first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment did limit the Equal
Protection Clause to racial inequality; it was struck down. As passed, it was specifically
designed to do two things: (1) “alter the relationship between the states and the federal
government,” and (2) guarantee that legislation be applied equally to all persons. 185 To
be sure, there were those who spoke in favor of classes, who were against a broader
application, and who only wanted it to apply to race; they were defeated.
In early April 1866, the first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted. It
read:
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States,
as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six,
no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination
shall be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.186
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This version was rejected and by April 30, another version was submitted that dropped
any allusion to race. The Amendment’s broader text was explained by Senator Howard: it
“disable[s] a State…from denying to [any person] the equal protection of the laws of the
States. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”187
Further, it was known that broad rights can be interpreted broadly by the courts.
For that reason, it was stressed that the Amendment should be as specific as they believed
necessary. From the minority report from the Joint Committee of the Indiana General
Assembly:
We have seen so many instances of stretching the powers of government in the
last few years, by resorting to new and startling constructions of what seemed to
be plain provisions, plainly written, that we feel the time has come when
proposed amendments should be freed from all ambiguity; and therefore we are
unwilling to sanction any new proposal to confer power upon the Federal
Government, by amending the Constitution, until we know its precise scope and
meaning.188

The Equal Protection Clause is often mistaken as vague. It seems that in light of
the country’s age and experience with the Supreme Court they were well aware of how
specific they were going to have to make the amendment, and they chose specifically to
make it broad. That is, it isn’t an inconclusive or unsettled statement of equality; it is a
statement of equality settled on the notion that it is without exception.
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In June of 1866 the final text was formally presented to the states. The National
Republican Party published an account of the 39th Congress, congratulating themselves
for abolishing any sense of caste:
The Republicans in Congress sought by legislation and by constitutional
amendment to guarantee to every citizen of the republic the equality of civil
rights before the law. How much did the Democrats do toward that object?
The Republicans in Congress sought to break up the foundations of secession and
rebellion by making citizenship national and not sectional. How much did the
Democrats do toward that object? The Republicans in Congress tried to the
extent of their powers to abolish throughout the bounds of the republic the evils
of caste, as second only to those of slavery. How much did the Democrats do
toward that object?189

As Calabresi notes, “the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment gave state legislators
ample notice that they understood the Amendment to prohibit caste or systems of specialinterest and class-based lawmaking.”190 The original intent was to use a universal
quantifier in place of a particular quantifier.
Unfortunately, the nature of passions and prejudice lends itself to improper
application of the Constitution. The manifestation of defiance in court cases is one of the
reasons that while precedent is important, it is imperfect. In 1885, the same justice who
wrote the Slaughter-House opinion was part of the majority in two cases, Barbier v.
Connolly, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that stated the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
quite differently. In Barbier v. Connolly it was said that,
The Fourteenth Amendment…undoubtedly intended not only that there should be
no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but
that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances
in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be
equally entitled to pursue their happiness and … that no impediment should be
189
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interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by
others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one
than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and …Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited…191

A year after Barbier, the Supreme Court said in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that “just and
equal laws” were necessary “so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights, the government of the commonwealth ‘may be a government of laws, and not of
men.’” They went on to express their abhorrence of the idea that “one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life at the mere will of another.” This, they said, is “the essence of slavery
itself.”192
The court continued to elucidate exactly what they believed the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was which included a prohibition even of laws which appeared
prima facie equal, but whose effects in operation were decidedly unequal:
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever
may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied…with a
mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of
that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.193
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The implication of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
adopted was simple. As stated by the justices in Yick Wo, it only required that laws be
applied equally so that we may be a country of laws and not of men.
It should not go unnoticed that the decision in Yick Wo concerned Chinese
immigrants, a minority with which the court had little familiarity. As such, it was likely
able to remain more impartial than it did in Plessy v. Ferguson, which did not overturn
Yick Wo so much as simply ignore it. Peter Irons suggests this is one reason Yick Wo fell
to relative obscurity,
Unlike blacks, who numbered some five million at the time, fewer than 100,000
Chinese lived in the United States, the vast majority in California. The institution
of slavery had provoked a bloody Civil War, while the Chinese…were ignored
by most people outside the West Coast. And the Supreme Court disposed of the
case without dissent…194

If there was ever an argument for the importance of a court being disinterested in its
ruling, the difference between Yick Wo and Plessy demonstrate that need.
Despite losing the Civil War, or perhaps because of losing the Civil War, many
Southerners made it clear that they “had no intention of treating the [black] freemen as
political equals, or even as fellow humans.”195 This became obvious with devices like the
Black Codes which were an attempt to return blacks to a condition similar to that of
slavery. Among other things, it restricted their movement, often forced them into labor
contracts, and prevented them from owning firearms, suing, or testifying in court.196 The
will of a zealous majority is not quelled easily.
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Before the former Confederate states were readmitted to the Union, they were
required to adopt new state constitutions and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. As many
would freely admit, there was little intention of following the Constitution. In 1873, The
Birmingham News wrote, “The rights guaranteed by the State and Federal constitutions
do not frighten us in the least. We do not expect to repeal any of the recent enactments.
[The reconstruction amendments] may stand forever—but we intend…to make them
dead-letters on the statute-book.”197 Indeed, even after the amendments to the
Constitution were added, a defiant south fought every expression of those amendments.
Through the end of the Nineteenth Century and beginning of the Twentieth
Century, violence escalated towards blacks who challenged “the established usages,
customs, and traditions” of white southerners. It was these traditions that would later be
cited in Plessy v. Ferguson to uphold the unconstitutional Jim Crow laws.198 By 1938
violence towards minorities both here and abroad had taken its toll on one justice who
made the moral decision that he would take action; it was morals fighting morals. Justice
Stone expressed his concerns in a letter to a New York Judge regarding the gruesome
stories being reported of lynch mobs torturing and killing blacks in the south199 and the
abuse of the Jewish population in Austria at the hands of Nazis. Spurred by violence that
“seem[ed] to bedevil the world”200 he composed a footnote for a seemingly arbitrary case,
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his Carolene Products opinion,201 that would go on to establish a tiered judicial review
system.
The footnote was important for the distinction it made between economic
legislation and civil rights legislation. The case was concerned with the Filled Milk Act
of 1923, and the court held that they would “presume the constitutionality of regulatory
laws ‘affecting ordinary commercial transactions’,” but if legislation reflects “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities” it might be necessary to use a “more searching
judicial inquiry,”202 which came to be known as Strict Scrutiny.
Footnote 4 and Strict Scrutiny became powerful weapons for minorities. Between
1938 and 1955, the NAACP took thirty-two cases to court and won twenty-nine of
them.203 But as powerful as they became, they never should have been needed. If it had
not been for vehement prejudice engulfing and crippling reason that was leading to such
violence, the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was originally adopted and even applied in
Barbier v. Connolly and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, would have covered the same cases.
It was later clarified that because laws by their nature do often classify
individuals, “[t]he mere fact of classification will not void legislation.”204 To reconcile
this practical reality with the Equal Protection Clause it was clarified that it is only
‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”205
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It is true that legislatures are charged with the arduous task of fitting imperfect
legislation onto a diverse polity for the sake of social order. The important point is that
these laws cannot violate the Constitution. In 1917, before Footnote 4 had been created, it
was said that
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by
preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation
of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.206

More recently the dissenting opinion in Plessy was quoted in the gay-rights case Romer v.
Evans, suggesting that the law may not create “classes”:
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the
rights of persons are at stake.207

This ruling is not only directly in line with the Fourteenth Amendment’s actual
precedent, it corresponds with Calabresi’s point: the grounds to prohibit discrimination
are more easily answered when Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is
“understood in the way that it was understood originally: as enacting a rule against class
legislation and systems of caste.” This was further clarified in 1869 by Senator Charles
Sumner in his lecture The Question of Caste.208
Judge Bork has given very reasonable standards to adhere to intent-Originalism in
the face of unforeseen circumstances:
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[A]ll an intentionalist requires is that the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a premise. That premise
states a core value that the framers intended to protect. The intentionalist judge
must then supply the minor premise in order to protect the constitutional freedom
in circumstances the Framers could not foresee.209

If Originalism allows for the references of provisions to expand in the face of unforeseen
circumstances, and if equal protection encompasses all people, it is unlikely that Bork or
Scalia would like what history would produce. When Judge Bork gives his reasoning for
how broadly an amendment can be read, he is not just saying that they must be read in the
sense of exactly what was discussed. He makes this clear, as does Scalia, by offering a
trajectory for new phenomena. The level of generality Bork believes is in the Equal
Protection Clause is race. It is with this reading he is able to explain that as new social
facts emerged, they affected the constitutionality of segregation. As the case is that the
Equal Protection Clause encompasses all persons, the only implicit exceptions are those
for which there is a rational basis. As discussed in the following two chapters there is no
such basis.
It should be noted that Judge Bork has not been discreet about his feelings
towards the gay community. In Slouching Towards Gomorrah, he warns of the
“homosexual movement,” and how this threat of modern liberalism is “assault[ing]”
“American’s culture… from within.”210 It seems for all the merits that Originalism – at
least at a broad level – might have, those who invoke it the most fervently often use it as
a guise to promote their own partisan ideals. It also shows the problem of any interpretive
method. If used impartially and consistently it might have restraint, but in the wrong
209

Bork, “Speech at the University of San Diego Law School,” (1985)
Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline, (New
York: HarperCollins e-books, 2010).
210

73

hands, any method can become a warped husk of its former self. After all, even the
infamous Dred Scott decision started out with an appeal to Originalism.211
It seems that the inclusion of all persons under the Equal Protection Clause, and
whether by trajectory, or the change that social facts have on old provisions, sexual
orientation can be securely placed under the Equal Protection Clause.
In the Supreme Court, the question becomes how do we determine where the line
should be drawn between acceptable classification and “invidious discrimination?” The
Supreme Court has noted that “[c]lassifications which are purposefully discriminatory
fall before the Equal Protection Clause,”212 and that the key requirement “[e]xplicit in all
the formulations is that a legislature must have had a permissible purpose.”213 This
requirement is a small enough hurdle that state legislation almost always passes it: “[s]o
deferential is the classification that it denies the challenging party any right to offer
evidence to seek to prove that the legislature is wrong in its conclusion that its
classification will serve the purpose it has in mind, so long as the question is at least
debatable and the legislature ‘could rationally have decided’ that its classification would
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foster its goal.”214 The next chapter will examine how to determine if there is a rational
basis.
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Chapter Five
The Geometry of Law
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to
exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his
passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
- James Madison
1787215
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cocksure of many
things that were not so.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
1918216
It was said in Chapter Four that the term equal, as it is used here, means that state
laws cannot make arbitrary distinctions among people. This, it seems, is the basic idea of
the rational-basis test. Determining what qualifies as arbitrary will be done here in two
ways: (1) reason and (2) precedent. Because this chapter sets the filters through which the
arguments in Chapter Six will be sifted, it is important to establish that because precedent
is imperfect, the emphasis placed on reason and empiricism imbedded in the Constitution
can act as a secondary filter and yield similar answers as current precedent.
Without an appreciation for the emphasis that was put on reason, some are led to
believe that modern society warrants a Burkian view, suggesting that the prejudices of
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tradition are necessary for social order.217 Amy Wax is critical of what she deems
“rationalists,” who “are skeptical of the notion, associated with conservative thinkers like
Hayek218 and Burke, that customary norms that emerge organically over time are likely to
be more beneficial than arrangements that are individually or bureaucratically devised
through a process of reason.”219 This point may have some cogence in regards to areas
outside of unalterable traits, but it misses the idea that same-sex relationships are not
arrived at via reason. With the exception of arranged relationships they are developed no
differently than different-sex relationships.
In another paper regarding same-sex marriage, she eschews the use of reason for
tradition and quotes Michael Oakeshott: “the rationalist project founders on the
fundamentally fallacious assumption that ‘what is made is better than what merely
grows.’”220 Oakeshott, she says,
…opposes the modernist tendency to bring ‘the political, legal, and institutional
inheritance’ before ‘the tribunal of intellect,’ and to make reason the ultimate
arbiter of policy and practice. Relying too much on reason does violence to the
nature of customary practice, which resists the demands of perfect coherence.221
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This assessment mischaracterizes the same-sex marriage debate. First, Oakeshott makes
the same mistake as Wax in terms of “what grows.” Same-sex relationships grow where
there are no prejudiced majorities to persecute them. Marriage has not always and
everywhere been exclusively heteronormative. More importantly, same-sex couples who
wish to wed are often in favor of tradition, which is why they want to get married.
There are only two things that require the use of reason in this debate: (1) to
determine if there are relevant differences in marriage as it relates to the state, and (2) to
determine if those differences will bring harm. If there are empirical answers, then reason
will extract them, and moreover, to not use reason is to go against the spirit of the
Constitution. According to Madison, innovation by reason for the benefit of personal
rights in the face of tradition is characteristically part of the American experiment:
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because
it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that,
whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of
their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit,
posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of
the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private
rights and public happiness.222

The United States was borne out of the Enlightenment, and it is well known that
reason was held in high esteem while passions and prejudice were considered
quintessentially antithetical to the American experiment. The founding fathers referenced
social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in their writings.
Hobbes’s emphasis on science and reason in the area of morals pervades The Federalist
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Papers. He believed moral philosophers could deduce empirical conclusions about “the
nature of human actions,” the same way geometricians had revealed the distinct “nature
of Quantity in Geometricall figures.” The tragedy, he said, was that they hadn’t.223
Hobbes used the reference to geometry in multiple writings, and it is no doubt
what influenced Hamilton to employ the same analogy. They both believed that where
reason failed, emotive impulses may lead to irrational majorities. “[T]he strength of
avarice and ambition,” Hobbes said, led to “the vulgar” believing that their opinions are
related to what is morally right or morally wrong.224
Hamilton similarly wrote that in a dispute one can never be sure if one side is
working on “purer principles than their antagonists.” It must be assumed that “ambition,
avarice, personal animosity, party opposition…are apt to operate” on both sides.225
Because of this, reason must remain paramount. When Hamilton wrote Federalist Paper,
No. 31, he discussed the importance of reason being paramount to passions, or prejudice:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first
principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an
internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands
the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either
from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of
some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in
geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are
equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in
ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means
ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate
with its object…226
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While human action has yet to be reduced to quantifiable bits, the emphasis on
reason and using tools of inquiry as opposed to other systems that beget knowledge, such
as divine revelation, was a central tenet in the construction of the United States. There are
legal scholars in the new natural law227 field who clamorously argue that any homosexual
conduct should be illegal because it contradicts natural human goods.228 Generally
informed by Thomas Aquinas, they make egregious errors in their
reasoning, such as conflating nature and nurture.229 Bertrand Russell summed up the
problem with Aquinas relative to those who use tools of inquiry:
[Aquinas] does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the
argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is
impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already
knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently
rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he
need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion
given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel
that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece
or of modern times.230

Because precedent can quickly be dismissed as judicial activism, it deserves
mention that the conditions required for justification of differential treatment outside of
precedent, if derived by reason, might yield something in the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s
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harm principle. In legal philosophy this seems to be the starting point for most western
liberal democratic theorists.231 Without an empirical claim the legislation is based on the
circular argument that homosexuality is immoral because homosexuality is immoral. In a
democracy concerned with the counter-majoritarian difficulty, this is problematic. A
majority could claim any trait or idea to be immoral or offensive, and ultimately castrate
the Fourteenth Amendment. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill writes,
[T]he sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.232

He then extended this same point to offense.
There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they
have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious
bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been
known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable
worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his
own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no
more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right
owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his
opinion or his purse.233

Indeed, considering the subjective values of liberty and equality before the law
that have been imbued into the Constitution, the moral whims of a majority do not create
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a logical justification, i.e. a rational basis, for the differential treatment of a minority.234
While this is important to keep in mind, lest a court ruling be deemed judicial activism,
the rational-basis test is a product of the court and the reality is that “[t]he life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience.”235 Consequently, how the rational-basis test
has been used historically will now be explored.
The root of rational basis review was a simple means-ends test. Only a few years
after establishing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall
elucidated the standard for overturning state legislation in McCullouch v. Maryland:
If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not
prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.236

This standard might have lasted had vicious majorities indifferent to reason not obliged
the court to establish a level of review that was more challenging for state legislation to
pass. After Footnote 4 was added and a tiered system of judicial review was established,
the rational-basis test took the place of the means-ends test.
Unfortunately in modern cases there is a discrepancy in the way that courts have
determined whether a rational basis exists. Currently there are two methods which can be
used to determine whether something passes the rational-basis test. One, which was
established in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. in 1911 says,
1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
234
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only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2.
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.237

Around the same time that the Lindsley standard was adopted, there was an adoption of a
slightly more lenient standard that allowed justices more room for judgment, but still
under the title of Rational Basis. In Royster Guano v. Virginia it was held that,
[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.238

The Lindsley standard has a greater emphasis on “complete arbitrariness” and
“irrationality” that makes it harder to fail;239 that is, there is a greater chance that state
legislation will not be overturned. The Royster standard allows the court more room to
consider the goal and how “fair and substantial” the purported legislation is at achieving
the goal it has set out to accomplish. Regardless of certain standards, “…In recent years,
the Court has been remarkably inconsistent in setting forth the standard which it is using,
and the results have reflected this… [and] [a]ttempts to develop a consistent principle
have so far been unsuccessful.” 240 The Supreme Court has conceded that even “the most
arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases cited applied a uniform or
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consistent test under equal protection principles,”241 and has yet to identify a single,
practicable method that would provide consistency. In a two year period the court used
the Lindsley method, the Royster method, and in between those cases it used an
amalgamation of the two methods. “In short, it is uncertain which formulation of the
rational basis standard the Court will adhere to [in any given case].”242
Whether the original means-ends test is applied, or a newer conception of the
rational-basis test, it is obvious that the standard at its most restrained will only uphold
legislation that a state legislature could have reasonably believed would be the means to a
legitimate end. The rational-basis test in modern adjudication seems to have given more
deference to the state legislatures than the original means-ends test, but it has also
become more protective of liberty and equal protection.
In 1996 “a jury in rural Wisconsin concluded that school officials violated the
constitutional rights of a gay teenager”243 by denying him equal protection when they
permitted other students to bully him in ways that were explicitly stopped for other
students.244 Also in 1996, Romer v. Evans, was decided. The court wrote that “so long as
the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate
legislative end” the court will uphold a state law, however the Colorado statute “indeed
defies, even this conventional inquiry.”245 They continued,
[T]he amendment raises the inevitable inference that it is born of animosity
toward the class that it affects… It is a status-based classification of persons
241
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undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not
permit.246

In Lawrence v. Texas (2003) the Supreme Court found that an anti-sodomy law in
Texas “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.” It was held that “the provision was ‘born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected’ and further that it had no rational relation
to a legitimate governmental purpose.”247 Interestingly, Lawrence acknowledges the
differences in simple rational basis review and forgoes strict scrutiny:
Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis
review normally pass constitutional muster, since “the Constitution presumes that
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes.” We have consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as “a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” are not legitimate state
interests. When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause. We have been most likely to
apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal
relationships.248

Because rational basis review is the most lenient standard of review, the burden
“is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it.”249 In Heller v. Doe Justice Kennedy articulated the interplay of
the court’s deference to state legislation and reality:
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification. “[A] legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.” […][The] courts are compelled under rational basis
246
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review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit
between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational basis review
because it “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality.”250

Significantly he qualifies this statement by setting a boundary:
True, even the standard of rationality as we so often have defined it must find
some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.251

Given the minimal requirements for a rational basis, we can assess the main
arguments against same-sex marriage and determine whether there is even a hypothetical
government interest that could be “reasonably conceived” and is more than a “bare desire
to harm” a minority group, and at least “find[s] some footing in the realities of the subject
addressed by the legislation.” The following chapter will distill arguments against samesex marriage to establish whether they provide a rational basis for proscription.

250
251

Ibid.
Ibid.

86

Chapter Six
Arguments
I believe that marriage is between a man and woman. It has been for all of
recorded history and I think this is a temporary aberration that will
dissipate. I think that it is just fundamentally goes against everything we
know.
- Newt Gingrich
2011252
[M]arriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a
woman and we have been presented with no authority to the contrary… It
appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the
statutes of Kentucky … but rather by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined.
- Court of Appeals of Kentucky
1973253
Marriage is ingrained on the human conscience as existing solely between
a man and a woman. That is why this is the only commonly accepted
arrangement found across all spectrums of religion, race, and culture.
- Ron Crews: President, Massachusetts Family Institute
2003254
If same-sex marriage can appropriately be decided in the Supreme Court, and if
the Equal Protection Clause can appropriately be applied, then the question concomitant
with the Equal Protection Clause is whether a rational basis for its prohibition can at least
be thought of as having footing grounded in reality. The purpose of this section is to
show that the arguments leveled against same-sex marriage do not have such footing.
252
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At the rational basis level of review, the onus is on those who challenge a statute
to explain why there is no rational basis – even in theory – for its existence. To determine
whether there is a rational basis for denying equal protection of the laws, we are tasked
with examining those theoretical arguments to see if “any state of facts reasonably” could
have been “conceived that would [have] sustain[ed]”255 them.
The arguments against same-sex marriage seem to revolve around a few central
points. This section will distill and consolidate those points. They will be framed in terms
of the arguments from the California Proposition 8 case and those from Professor Amy
Wax.

I. Prohibition of same-sex marriage advances the vital state interest in proceeding
with caution when considering fundamental changes to a vitally important social
institution.

One point that gets some traction is that same-sex marriage might have a negative
effect on different-sex marriage, and because marriage is a “vitally important social
institution,” that negative effect might implicate the rest of society. Wax acknowledges
that same-sex marriage could very well help the institution as a whole, but, “[t]he
alternative is that marriage (and, by extension, society) will suffer if gays are permitted to
enter into the state of matrimony.”256
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She asserts a kind of broken windows thesis257 in regards to sexual
“devian[ce],”258 noting that same-sex marriage could threaten different-sex marriage
because “conduct is mediated by social meanings and understandings.”259 In her view,
[C]onservatives are attuned to the crucial role of conventions—including the
customary forms surrounding established institutions—in promoting moral
conduct and maintaining the proper functioning of social life…. That social
norms often serve to restrain self-regarding, irresponsible behavior renders them
fragile and vulnerable even to remote or obscure effects. Because cultural
practices are maintained through group consent, conformity is crucial to their
vitality, and deviant conduct poses a potential threat to their very integrity.260

This reasoning rests on a circular assumption and it ignores a very crucial point. If
the fear is that “deviant conduct” might lead to more “deviant conduct,” or to a
breakdown of marriage, there is a built-in assumption that homosexuality or same-sex
marriage is deviant. If homosexuality or same-sex marriage were not considered deviant,
then per her theory, they would not beget forms of sexual deviance, and subsequently
would not weaken the institution of different-sex marriage. It is precisely the suggestion
that either are deviant that would allow any person to believe they live in a society that
condones sexual deviance if same-sex marriage were legal. This argument is predicated
on the assumption that same-sex marriage is deviant because same-sex marriage is
deviant. Further, the idea if society consents to X then X is maintained, does not imply if
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society consents to X and Y then X will not be maintained. Y would have to have some
negative effect on X, and her point is that deviant behavior has that effect, but as we have
established it is the assumption of deviance and that assumption’s manifestation, such as
in laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, which stigmatize same-sex marriage and give it
the label, deviant.
Of course, if it is only the idea of non-conformance that defines deviance then two
separate points should be made: (1) no two marriages are alike, so why stop at sex? In
1967 it was argued before the Supreme Court that interracial marriage does not conform
to normative expectations and is therefore deviant.261 When Wax is concerned that if
“conventions” and “customary forms” are not held up that this will lead to the demise of
marriage, she is omitting all of the relevant aspects of marriage that do perpetuate its
existence outside of genitalia alone. There are many different-sex couples that cannot
conceive, so the only consistent difference between same-sex relationships and differentsex relationships is the genitalia. The history of marriage shows that relationships have
been based on everything from property,262 to punishment,263 to love, to companionship,
to attraction and so on. Whatever the basis was, and whatever perpetuated its existence in
society, it has at least been more than the simple matter of genitalia.
And (2) it should not be forgotten that sexual orientation is an unalterable trait.
Whatever the person’s orientation, it does not help the institution of straight-marriage to
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prevent gay-marriage. It only means that there are less happily (and to be fair, unhappily)
married couples.
We can also appeal to lessons of experience. It seems that just because a minority
is capable of doing something there is no logical implication that a person in the majority
will stop doing it. The fact that gays can adopt does not seem to have stopped straight
people from wanting to adopt. When the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, it didn’t
appear to cause fewer whites to vote. Proposition 8 in California, which banned same-sex
marriage, was passed after same-sex marriage had been legal for some time in California
and it did not repeal legislation that acknowledged same-sex married couples betrothed in
other states. The counsel defending Prop 8, did not “submit[] one affidavit – not one
unverified allegation – that a single resident of California either was less likely to get
married or viewed his or her marriage as less valuable or less stable because California
had [previously] extended some measure of marriage equality to same-sex couples.”264
Theodore Olson argues that “against the background of California’s short, but
entirely uneventful, experience with providing marriage rights to same-sex couples,” that
the district court’s finding that same-sex marriage has no discernable negative impact on
opposite-sex marriage, is unassailable. Without any “reasonable” theory the proponents
of Prop 8 are asserting that an “unsubstantiated fear of negative externalities of equality is
sufficient to justify inequality,” which then makes “discrimination self-justifying.”265 The
Supreme Court has held that in matters of civil rights, even the most deferential
interpretation of the rational-basis test which assumes the constitutional validity of
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legislation, must be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest,”266 without
which it is simply “invidious discrimination which offends the Constitution.”267
Further, it should be noted that in regards to any such harm that may befall society
Olson writes in his brief that,
[W]hen the district court asked [the proponents of Prop 8’s] council point blank
what harm would come to opposite-sex married couples if gay and lesbian
couples could marry, Proponents’ counsel mustered only, “I don’t know. I don’t
know.”…. Proponents’ “deinstitutionalization” expert, David Blankenhorn, had
not seen a seminal 2009 study that empirically tested his theory of
deinstitutionalization and that concluded that “laws permitting same-sex marriage
or civil unions have no adverse effect on marriage, divorce, and abortion rates,
the percent of children born out of wedlock, or the percent of households with
children under 18 headed by women.”268

Often the point that opponents of same-sex marriage, including Professor Wax,
miss is that same-sex couples are not asking for a new institution, or an amendment to the
current institution of marriage. They are asking for the same legal recognition that
different-sex couples get. Marriage as it is relevant to the law, does not have any
conditions to satisfy which require two different sexes. For the purpose of conversation a
person might differentiate between the parties involved – straight-marriage, gaymarriage, interracial-marriage – but as far as what is relevant to the state, there need not
be a distinction between marriage, gay marriage, or interracial marriage.
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II. Prohibiting same-sex marriage advances the vital state interests of responsible
procreation and childrearing.

Wax states that if same-sex couples are recognized as married, “then behavior
surrounding all marital relations may change in response…. For example…procreation
might become less central to marriage. This might foster a model of marriage that views
children as optional or even unimportant.”269 In the fight over Proposition 8 in California
similar fears were raised. The proponents of Prop 8 cited “the possibility of long-term
adverse societal consequences.” The proffered reason was that marriage equality might
“sever[] civil marriage from its traditional procreative purposes, resulting in a corrosion
of marital norms, including that fathers should take responsibility for the children they
beget and sexual fidelity…and ultimately social devaluation of marriage as an
institution.”270
Responsible procreation and childrearing has long been an argument of opponents
of same-sex marriage. As Theodore Olson points out, this concept “encompasses two
distinct, but related, concepts: First, it addresses the State’s desire to channel those
heterosexual couples who might beget children ‘by accident’ into marital family units.
But it also entails a purported interest in raising children in what Proponents [of Prop 8]
have deemed to be the ‘optimal social structure’ for child development—a man and a
woman, bound together in marriage, raising children genetically related to both
parents.”271 In fact, in Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, Wax points to
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the importance of a biological connection between parents and children. The problem is
that the studies she cites in favor of this are not analogous to same-sex couples.
She says that “[m]ost relevant to the same-sex marriage debate is the data on
different types of blended families. In particular, evidence has emerged that stepparent
families are significantly less beneficial for children than intact nuclear families.”272 It
doesn’t take much thought to realize that stepparent families might include significant
differences than families that manage to stay together: potential conflict between parents,
or the change of authority figures for children for example. She even lauds the fact that
they controlled for “factors such as ‘parental education, number of siblings, race and
religion.’”273 But did they control for conflict and success of a relationship? She cites the
study:
[L]ate adolescents and young adults who had grown up with both biological
parents performed better on school achievement tests, had fewer children as
teenagers, finished high school more often, attended college more often, and
were more likely to be employed in early adulthood than those who had grown
up with a single parent or a stepparent. Furthermore, although “[c]hildren living
with a stepparent . . . were almost as well off economically as children living
with two biological parents,” they nonetheless were “at least as likely as children
who had lived with a single parent to drop out of high school or to have a baby
before they turned twenty.” The authors concluded that “[f]or adolescents, the
economic advantages of having a stepparent seemed to be offset by
psychological disadvantages.” In sum, parental matrimony measurably benefits
children, but welfare is most enhanced when both parents are biologically related
to the child.274

Equating this study to same-sex marriage is patently dishonest. Single parents
have their own set of problems with which to contend (the possibility of lacking a model
for close adult interaction for example), but even comparing same-sex couples to a
272
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stepparent model is disingenuous, and confuses correlation and causation. The American
Psychological Association has written, “[i]f a stepparent is frequently battling his former
spouse, research shows that his children suffer. But if he is close with his ex-partner, his
new spouse may feel anxious and insecure. On top of this, say experts, many children
don't view their step-parents as ‘real parents’ for the first few years—if ever.”275 No
rational conclusion can be drawn from Wax’s analogy because the implied premise,
“same-sex couples are equivalent to stepparent couples,” is absurd.
There is a substantial amount of research that goes into the best ways for
stepfamilies to succeed because of the amount of conflict that often develops. Wax is
correct with her assessment of the children of stepfamilies; after all, it is “the children,
who often suffer the most through divorce, remarriage and stepfamily situations. They are
particularly at-risk if their biological parents are in conflict, the divorce situation is
protracted, they receive less parenting after the divorce or they lose important
relationships as a result of the divorce…”276 Subsequently, there are many reasons that
stepfamilies require special attention, but this point only serves to undermine her
argument. Remarriage is not illegal. Same-sex couples who are in a loving, committed
relationship and together from a child’s infancy do not exhibit any of the same risks as
stepfamilies. This point, that marriages which are not positive environments for children
should be minimized, is not practicable in any sense. If followed to its conclusion, it
would disallow remarriages, and possibly divorce. But an abusive unhappy first marriage
is likely worse for the children than a happy second marriage, so that doesn’t work either.
It is understandable that a state would want to only “reward” families that produce a
275
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positive environment for children, but this is not feasible without looking at each
individual family.
In the Prop 8 case opponents of same-sex marriage stated their belief that the
“‘special recognition and encouragement’ of marriage may be withheld from same-sex
couples…because they … cannot in any circumstance, create an ‘optimal’ childrearing
environment.’”277 This claim, however, is not supported by the facts, and subsequently
cannot substantiate even remote belief, let alone debate.
It is indicative of passions or prejudice when biased studies which should fail peer
review are published making such claims. Sociologist Mark Regnerus recently released a
study, “New Family Structures Study,”278 that conflicts with thirty years of research. It
questioned the parenting of LGBT parents and made a number of negative claims. After
the study was published in a reputable journal, Social Science Research (SSR), some
eyebrows were raised at the methodology used and possible conflicts of interest in the
review process. Consequently, an internal audit was conducted by SSR’s editorial board,
and found that the “peer-review system failed because of ‘both ideology and inattention’
on the part of the reviewers.”279
They found that there were “significant, disqualifying problems” with the
methodology and “scholars who should have known better failed to recuse themselves
from the review process.” 280 The study’s author later admitted, “I said ‘lesbian mothers’
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and ‘gay fathers,’ when in fact, I don’t know about their sexual orientation.”281 The
American Psychological Association issued a scathing assessment of the study and
further noted that,
On the basis of a remarkably consistent body of research on lesbian and gay
parents and their children, the American Psychological Association and other
health, professional, and scientific organizations have concluded that there is no
scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual
orientation… That is, lesbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual
parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for their children. This
body of research has shown that the adjustment, development, and psychological
well-being of children are unrelated to parental sexual orientation and that the
children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of heterosexual parents
to flourish.282

Moreover in November 2011 when a gay-rights issue was before the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Massachusetts, an Amici Curiae brief was submitted on behalf of
The American Medical Association, The American Psychological Association, The
American Academy of Pediatrics, The Massachusetts Psychological Association, The
American Psychiatric Association, and The National Association of Social Workers and
its Massachusetts Chapter. It addressed, sexual orientation, and sexual orientation as it
relates to relationships and childrearing. It came to the same conclusion stated above and
added that they wanted to “emphasize that the abilities of gay and lesbian persons as
parents and the positive outcomes for their children are not areas where credible
scientific researchers disagree.”283
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In fact, the expert witness which the opponents of same-sex marriage relied on in
the Proposition 8 case, “Paul Nathanson testified in his deposition that peer-reviewed
studies of the effect of permitting gay men and lesbians to marry on the rearing of
children ‘don’t detect problems and they don’t predict problems.’”284
As for the possibility that the prohibition of same-sex marriage will “‘increase[e]
the likelihood’ that heterosexual couples with the capacity to procreate accidentally will
marry,”285 there is no rational reason a person can come to this conclusion. In fact there is
such a lack of reality to this premise that the proponents of Prop 8, merely stated that this
would be the case, but made “no argument at all” to support the premise “that prohibiting
same-sex couples from entering relationships designated marriage will make it more
likely that heterosexual couples in California will marry.”286
If laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were really geared toward rewarding
procreation they would not legally be able to leave out the numerous other groups that
cannot procreate.287 Omitting other groups makes this argument “so woefully
underinclusive as to render belief in [its purported end] a challenge to the credulous.”288
Further, while these groups are different, that
difference is “irrelevant unless [same-sex couples] would threaten [Proponents’
interest] in a way that other [infertile heterosexual couples] would not.” Samesex couples pose no such unique threat to Proponents’ efforts to channel
instances of accidental procreation into marriage, and thus the same-sex nature of
the union is not a “rational[] justif[ication]” for singling them out for disfavored
treatment.289
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If the prohibition of same-sex marriage “is intended to reserve ‘special recognition’ of
marriage for couples that can procreate ‘by accident,’ it ‘ma[k]e[s] no sense in light of
how [it] treat[s] other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.’”290
Responsible procreation and childrearing might be a vital state interest, but it is
decidedly separate from same-sex marriage. It does not provide justification beyond
“invidious discrimination,” considering the various other groups that can marry, remarry,
and raise children.

III. Slippery slope argument: If same-sex marriage is allowed, then bigamy, adult
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, obscenity and/or
pedophilia might become legal.

Slippery slope arguments are generally problematic because they use extreme
hypotheticals to leverage fear about the issue at hand. In the case of same-sex marriage,
slippery slope arguments are invoked to make one of two conclusions: (1) it will lead to
society slowly accepting the extreme scenario’s (which they find unpleasant), or (2) if a
state cannot engage in legal moralism, the Supreme Court will be able to strike down
laws against these extreme hypotheticals, which would implicate all victimless crimes.
The first issue is one of social mores and less concerned with the court. As the
argument goes, if social mores change then laws may be passed which allow things like
bestiality or prostitution. A person may service a goat, or take money in exchange for sex,
but the impetus to do either of those things is not a trait completely inseparable from their
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person. Money is an artifact of society, so it cannot be argued to be inseparable from the
individual. Considering the development of sexual orientation occurs internally it is
necessarily separate from the external world, including other animals. As it was stated in
the introduction, there may be social constructs which lead to situational sexual behavior,
and that may very well be what leads to bestiality, but the drive to have sex with animals,
is at the very least something that occurs external to the individual.
Perhaps more importantly, the fear that society will learn to accept bestiality if
they accept homosexuality, misses something else entirely. It can only be claimed that
there is any parity between the two, if sexual activity is looked at in such a narrow sense
as to have a single isolated end: orgasm. In that case, it would necessarily implicate
heterosexual acts as well. Indeed, those who fear that an approval of homosexuality may
lead to an approval of bestiality, do so because in their mind there is nothing more to
homosexuality than the sexual act itself – nothing more than the absolute end of orgasm:
Those who propound “gay” ideology or theories of same-sex marriage or “sexual
activity” have no principled moral case to offer against (prudent and moderate)
promiscuity, indeed the getting of orgasmic sexual pleasure in whatever friendly
touch or welcoming orifice (human or otherwise) one may opportunely find it
in.291

Of course, just as in different-sex relationships – even the casual one-night stand – there
is usually more than the single end of orgasm. As soon as a concept slightly more
abstract, like intimacy, is added it would separate both heterosexual human relationships
and homosexual human relationships from bestiality. There is nothing inherent about
homosexuality that makes it any closer to bestiality than heterosexuality, so there is no
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logical justification to prohibit one and not the other. But with all that said, regarding
purely what society does and does not accept is not the concern of the court. What is the
concern of the court is the second argument.
All of the examples which opponents of gay rights or same-sex marriage offer can
be prohibited by the state without the legalization of same-sex marriage affecting them
because prostitution, bigamy, incest, and so on are all defined and driven by external as
opposed to internal factors and therefore do not engage the Equal Protection Clause.
Bigamy for example is often thrown around as if the court would not be able to discern a
difference. Consider the argument. Bigamy is not rooted on anything fundamentally
inseparable from the person. It is only a condition of want grounded in external factors; as
in a person might change their mind and not want it later. People cannot change their
mind about their sexual orientation, and while some of them certainly want to get
married, that want is not isolated. If the Equal Protection Clause were used in situations
composed purely of want, it would become utterly meaningless. Segregationists want
segregation, “traditionalists” want only their version of marriage recognized by the state,
and just like Mill pointed out, thieves want the victim’s purse.
If sexual orientation occurs internally, and is an immutable part of that person
then same-sex marriage is only the manifestation of that inseparable quality, and that
manifestation produces no harm. All of the hypothetical victimless crimes result from no
such internal trait that is inseparable from the individual, and therefore the state may
engage in all the moral legislation that it like without the court interfering. It only
becomes repugnant to the Constitution when morals legislation arbitrarily treats groups of
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persons unequally.292 The Supreme Court has said that in the case of equal protection,
“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable…are not permissible bases for” differential treatment.293

IV. Semantics

One argument that is often used is that of semantics: that the definition of
marriage will not support same-sex marriage. To these people, saying same-sex marriage
is akin to saying round square. The very meaning of marriage just cannot support the
concept of a same-sex couple. Of course, as Adele Mercier, has pointed out, this confuses
meaning and reference.
The meanings of all words of all languages, with the exception of proper names
(which refer all and only to well-defined single objects, i.e. to a person), always
stretch beyond their current reference. The word ‘Canadians’ currently applies to
a different group of people than it applied to a hundred years ago, and than it will
apply to a hundred years hence…. Words can undergo reference changes without
a change in meaning…. before Emancipation, the word ‘citizen’ had never been
applied to Blacks in the US, it would follow from [the semantic argument] that,
as a matter of necessity, Blacks cannot be citizens.294

Note that she does not mean that according to the semantic argument they shouldn’t be
citizens, as was debated during the reconstruction amendments, but rather that despite
any amendments, if the semantic argument is to hold, they couldn’t be citizens.
Importantly, she goes on to say that those who make this argument are committed to the
292
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view “that Emancipation, by extending its reference, changed the very meaning of the
word ‘citizen’.”295 That is, they are “committed to the view that, after Emancipation, even
Whites were no longer citizens according to the usual meaning of that term in the
language.”296 In this same vein, if the semantic argument against same-sex marriage were
to be sustained, it would follow that when Massachusetts declared that same-sex couples
could legally be recognized as married, all married heterosexual couples in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts were no longer married “according to the usual
meaning of that term.”
As far as the legal conditions require, the term marriage fully supports same-sex
couples. While some religions may not approve, per the First Amendment, the state has
no interest in respecting any one religion. It seems that it is the distinct difference
between the meaning of the word marriage in civic and religious circles that leads to the
semantic argument.
In her affidavit submitted to the Canadian court system in 2001, she made the
point that in Canada there are two distinct concepts of marriage, and this, it seems, is
similar to the case in the United States.
[Religious marriages and civil marriages] are properly distinct, not only in
contemporary consciousness but in the religious and legal institutions that are
commonly understood to underlie such concepts. That is demonstrated by the fact
that a religious marriage is not recognized by Canadian law as a legal marriage
unless it is authorized by the state to be a legal marriage, and that not all legal
marriages are recognized as religious marriages.
Various grounds suffice for a religious marriage to be annulled in some religions;
but an annulment even by the Pope does not constitute in and of itself the
dissolution of a legal marriage.

295
296

Ibid.
Ibid.

103

The Anglican Church did not recognize as a religious marriage the Duke of
Windsor’s civil marriage to Mrs. Simpson because she had previously divorced.
Many religions do not recognize as religious marriage the legal (or religious)
marriages of one of their members with someone of a different religion.
It is one of the foundational principles of logic (known as Leibniz’s law from the
philosopher of the same name) that two things are identical if and only if they
have all and only the same relevant properties. Religious marriages and civil
marriages have some but not all of their relevant properties in common. Hence
they are distinct.297

Mercier notes that “[i]t is an empirical issue, not one of norms, whether gays and lesbians
have the capacities required for marriage.”298 The conditions that have defined marriage
across time and culture have changed. The state’s purpose for involving itself in marriage
in the first place, to limit clandestine marriages, is not affected by the sex of the two
people getting married.
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Conclusion
The Subjection of Gays and Lesbians
[O]ne feels that among all the lessons which men require for carrying on
the struggle against the inevitable imperfections of their lot on earth, there
is no lesson which they more need, than not to add to the evils which
nature inflicts, by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one another.
Their vain fears only substitute other and worse evils for those which they
are idly apprehensive of: while every restraint on the freedom of conduct
of any of their human fellow-creatures…dries up pro tanto the principal
fountain of human happiness, and leaves the species less rich, to an
inappreciable degree, in all that makes life valuable to the individual
human being.
- John Stuart Mill
1869299
The principle agent of change in a republic is social attitude. A change in attitudes
will foster change in legislation and in extreme cases a constitutional amendment. If the
amendment provokes emotive responses there are often predictable attempts to subvert
every manifestation of that amendment. In these cases, it requires a “guardians of rights,”
to stop states from violating what has already been adopted in the Constitution. It is an
unfortunate truth that just because something is constitutionally protected does not mean
that in practice it will be. Sometimes it is because the legislatures and the Supreme Court
are mistaken about the facts, and sometimes it is because those legislatures are motivated
by the “influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice.”300 Whether it’s The
Birmingham News’s declaration that it would explicitly contravene the Constitution or
the century discrepancy between the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment (1870), and the
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passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which allowed the Fifteenth Amendment to
become a reality, sometimes emotive impulses disregard reason and flout the
Constitution. That the Constitution protects same-sex marriage will probably not be
recognized by the states for some time, and if the Supreme Court should figure it out
before the states, and act, those states will predictably claim judicial activism, just as they
did in 1954.
Fortunately, for the LGBT community, the court has acknowledged the facts and
sexual orientation has been recognized over the last two decades as being covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment. First in Romer v. Evans, and then further in Lawrence v. Texas.
In her concurring opinion of Lawrence, Justice O’Conner eloquently explained why laws
aimed at same-sex couples but not opposite-sex couples do not pass the rational-basis
test:
The statute at issue here makes sodomy a crime only if a person “engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however,
is not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based
solely on the participants. Those harmed by this law are people who have a samesex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior prohibited
by § 21.06. Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby
making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as
everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral
effects of the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law
“legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways
unrelated to the criminal law,” including in the areas of “employment, family
issues, and housing.”
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by
itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is
not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e. g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S., at
534; Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S., at 634-635. Indeed, we have never held that
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient
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rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates
among groups of persons.
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under
the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be “drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” Id., at 633. Texas'
invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more
than Texas' desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection
Clause prevents a State from creating “a classification of persons undertaken for
its own sake.” Id., at 635. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law
as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of
dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal
behavior. The Texas sodomy law “raise[s] the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.”301

Some will see decisions like Romer and Lawrence and they will argue that morals
changed, and so the Supreme Court is “imposing upon all Americans the resolution
favored by the elite class from which the Members of [the court] are selected,
pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.”302 But this misunderstands
the nature of a written constitution. The court doesn’t need to believe that animosity
towards homosexuality is evil to see that a person and all that is concomitant with that
term is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, unless there is a rational basis for not
allowing it. It is an unfortunate bout of adjudicating by morals when a justice understands
that a provision’s reference necessarily broadens in the context of new facts, but not
when they personally disagree with it. This, however, has been the history of civil-rights
struggles.
While majority rules in a democracy, Justice Brennan once observed, “faith in
democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another.”303 The problem of passions and

301

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (O’Conner, concurring.)
See supra note 53.
303
Justice Willaim J. Brennan, Jr., “Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium,” (1985), in Originalism:
A Quarter Century of Debate, ed. Steven G. Calabresi (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, inc., 2007).
302

107

prejudice tyrannizing a minority in spite of the Constitution is why in a democracy people
would vest in “electorally unaccountable justices” the power to overturn democratically
adopted legislation. It is part of the counter-majoritarian difficulty to ask “…Which
values…qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental…to be vindicated by the Court
against other values affirmed by legislative acts?”304
In the Fourteenth Amendment the value of equal protection was explicitly
demarcated, and if the court acts accordingly, it can only strike down state legislation that
conflicts with it. It has been said that for a constitutional democracy to maintain
legitimacy justices must adhere to the provisions in a constitution as they were originally
understood – they ought to value judicial restraint. Those who have put forward ideas of
Originalism in a specific sense, are emphatic about how restrained their methods are, and
believe themselves resilient for being able to administer such “strong medicine.”305 But
under scrutiny, the problem with their methods are not just that they are too specific, it is
that they are often only specific in areas that they don’t want to see rights expanded.
Looking for an original understanding of a provision at a specific level is problematic
when an original consensus did not exist, but even more problematic is when a justice
adheres tightly to original moral perceptions and upholds a statute specifically antithetical
to the purpose of the amendment.
It has often been put forward that sexual orientation is not covered by the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not considered during the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore not part of its meaning. This, however, confuses meaning and
reference.
304
305
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The 39th Congress had the opportunity to make the Equal Protection Clause
specific; they declined. They opted instead for an amendment that meant laws must be
applied equally to all persons without exception. Of course, exceptions do occur, as they
do with all amendments, but as the court later clarified the exceptions must have some
justification, and those justifications must have some footing in reality.
Two points float to the top in regards to the Fourteenth Amendment’s application
to sexual orientation: (1) Homosexuality was around, but the facts surrounding it –
orientation not being a choice, it being immutable, and it not being harmful to society –
were unknown. This is analogous to Bork’s segregation point: when the facts (social or
otherwise) that define something are discovered to be different than previously thought
and this discovery establishes that an amendment is plainly being broken, “it is obvious
the Court must choose equality and prohibit state-imposed”306 laws that defy the
Constitution. (2) As evidenced by the quotes that open up Chapter Six, the concept of
same-sex marriage, in the U.S. at least, is a new phenomenon. It therefore requires some
kind of assessment of trajectory. Considering the absolute character the phrase “equal
protection of the laws” was given, that trajectory should easily cover sexual orientation,
and subsequently same-sex marriage.
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